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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Lutheran High School Association of the Greater Salt Lake Area ("Lutheran") has appealed 
from, and seeks review by the court of, rulings of the trial court on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and denied summary 
judgment for Lutheran. On September 30,2002, Lutheran filed its Notice of Appeal from the Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. at 676-677. The issues are as follows: 
1. What is the rule in Utah regarding easements where there has been an expansion of 
the dominant estate or a connection of the easement to a non-dominant parcel? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in its determinations that there is no genuine issue of material fact; and, as a matter of law, that the 
easement has not been overburdened by overuse or by improper uses? 
3. Did the trial Court err in its application of law and material facts in denying 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and its determination that an expansion of the dominant 
estate had not occurred, and/or that the easement was not overburdened? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of appellate review is as follows: Summary Judgment should be upheld only 
if the pleadings, depositions, Answers to Interrogatories and Admissions on file, together with 
Affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a Motion for 
Summary Judgment is a legal one, and will be reviewed for correctness. The appellate court views 
the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. The appellate court does not defer to the 
legal conclusions of the trial court. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Alder v. Bayer Corp.. 2002 UT 115, f 20, 
61 P.3d 1068, 1075; Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules which determine the 
outcome of this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is a matter in which Lutheran sought relief from misuse of an 
easement. The misuse results from Respondents' expansion of the dominant estate and/or 
connection of the easement for the benefit of an adjacent non-dominant parcel. 
Course of Proceedings. In 1996, this action was commenced by Lutheran to complain that 
Respondents had acquired additional adjacent land to the north of the dominant estate; had 
improperly expanded the dominant estate or the use of the easement over Appellant's servient tract 
to benefit the acquired parcel; had connected and integrated the additional land to the dominant 
estate's roadway system; and, as a result, had improperly extended the use of the easement to non-
dominant property and misused the servient estate. 
Lutheran and Respondents each presented Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Respondents' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, and denied the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lutheran. Lutheran has appealed from 
the Order. 
Disposition by Trial Court. Both parties submitted Motions for Summary Judgment. [R. 
at 213; 414.] The trial court granted summary judgment for the Wobdlands Owners. [Minute Entry 
R. at 588-591. Addendum, Ex. D.] The court's Order stated, over Lutheran's objections: 
5. The Easement, which is for the benefit of the dominant estate, has not 
been overburdened by the use of the Easement, by the owners, tenants, subtenants 
and concessionaires of Tract B and their customers, invitees and guests, including 
their use of the Easement to access parking on Tract C. 
6. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract B and 
their customers, invitees and guests, may continue to use the Easement to access 
parking on Tract C. 
7. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract C and 
their customers, invitees and guests, may not use the Easement. Accordingly, 
Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the 
Easement by the Tower IV tenants, subtenants and concessionaires and their 
customers, invitees and guests, including notifying them, restricting access as part of 
the lease agreements, and such other steps as may be appropriate. [R. at 664.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Foundation, a. In 1983, certain real property in Salt Lake County, Utah, situated at 
approximately 4000 South, between 700 East and 900 East (property which had previously been 
owned and operated as the Woodland Drive-In Theaters by Eugene Woodland, aka "Captain 
Nemo"1) was essentially divided into two adjacent (abutting) tracts. Woodland Investment Co., a 
Utah limited partnership (of which Eugene Woodland was the general partner) retained "Tract A", 
1
 The historical use of the property as the Woodland Drive-in, by Eugene Woodland is 
not established by the record, but is a matter of notoriety and common knowledge for long-time 
residents in the community, and among the parties, of which the court of appeals may take 
judicial notice. That history was acknowledged in oral argument by Respondents' counsel. See 
hearing transcript, R. at 694, transcript pages 3 and 4. 
Page 3 
\-r J* -*•• ; • • • :- :i.J -IOHL 900 East. The Woodlands Associates, a joint venture, 
acquired "Tract B", the western tract situated along 700 East. [CompL, f9,10, and 11, record \ * 
i Easemen. ! ^ " ^ thereto R. at 
14, 22-24; Answer of named Defendants other than Bedford Property Investors, Inc. ("Bedford")2, 
Admis., R. at 77-78. 
omiection with the contemporaneous acquisition of Tract B by 
the joint venture, the parties entered into an agreement known as the Declaration of Easements, 
i ovena... - ,x IM MIU • i ' v t Bwcre specifically identified 
and more particularly described by legal description. [ R d\ ; 1J .md i 3; Admis. on R. at 77, R. at 
138. The Declaration, as amended, is attached as Exhilwl A ii- •• HK«.* iii | 
This space intentiona] ] j 1 ef t b] ai ik. 
2
 Throughout its Answer, Bedford claimed to lack sufficient information to answer most 
allegations. 
3
 It is to be noted that the legal descriptions attached as Exhibits to the Declaration were 
reversed. An Amended Declaration of Easements, Covenants & Restrictions was recorded on 
June 20, 1984, as Entry No. 3957731, Book 5566, Page 2146, to correctly set forth the respective 
parcels. A copy of the Amended Declaration is attached to the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by Defendants. It is noted at R. at 163, and found at 
R. at 188-193. 
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non-exclusive appurtenant easements to one another, each specifically for the benefit of the grantee's 
parcel as the dominant estate thereof [R. at . - dispute in this matter concerns the use of 
and burden placed on the easement ("Easement") across Tract A, as the servient estate, by the owners 
and users of Tract B, as the dominant estate. In the Declaration, the then-owner of Tract A, or 
A\ r > \^  -n 
(a) Woodland grants to Associates a non-exclusive easement appurtenant 
to and across Tract A for the purpose of allowing vehicular access between the public 
streets and any and all parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract B; 
provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be limited to use for such purposes 
and to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract B for commercial purposes 
(including, but not limited to, reasonable and customary deliveries). . . . [Decl., 
Section 4(a) on ^5 thereof. R. at 18.] 
(d) The easements granted pursuant to this Section 4 shall benefit each 
of the Parties and their respective tenants, concessionaires, customers, invitees and 
guests, and the concessionaires, invitees, customers and guests of any tenant or 
subtenant of the respective parties. [Id. R. at 19.] 
" d S ' ^ i . 
terminated. [Decl. f5, R. at 1 v JP ; The Declaration cannot be extended, modified or amended 
except by agreement JI UIL* puuu., ^ ^ ^ was expressly provided that the 
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Declaration shall not be deemed to be a gift or a dedication to the public, " . . . it being the intent of 
the Parties that this Declaration be strictly limited to and for the purpose expressed herein." [Decl. 
\1. R. at 20.] The Declaration also made clear that the tract benefitted was intended to constitute 
the dominant estate, and that the tract burdened was to constitute the servient estate. [Decl. f 8(a). 
R. at 20.] 
c. The Easement is an easement appurtenant. [Undisputed fact presented by Respondents, 
^|6, R. at 163; Decl. ^[4(a), R. at 18.] The Respondents have no "special" knowledge of the 
negotiations which relate in any way to the Declaration other than that which is expressed in the 
Declaration. [Answer to Interrog. 7, attached to Appellant's Memo. R. at 272-273.] 
3. Development of Tract B. a. Tract B, the dominant parcel, was approved and developed 
as a commercial planned unit development known as "Woodlands Business Park". [S.L. County 
Planning Comm'n Mins. 11/22/83, R. at 187. Declaration of CC&R for Woodlands Business Park 
("CCR") R. at 438, Sixth Amendment to CCR, beginning at R. at 486, attached, Legal Description 
of Woodlands Business Park (acknowledging the PUD) R. at 498. Letter to S.L. Co. R. at 576.] 
b. Prior to 1992, Woodlands Business Park had been developed to include a parking 
structure, two office towers, two "strip center" type buildings for retail commercial establishments 
and some open parking. [Compl. |15. R. at 4. Admis. in Answer: R. at 78, R. at 278.] 
4. The Parties Acquire Tracts A and B. a. In 1992, Tract A was sold to Lutheran. 
[Compl. ^fl2. R. at 4. Defs.' recitation of undisputed facts. R. at 165.] 
b. From 1993 through 1999, Woodlands III Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands m") and JDJ 
Properties, Inc. ("JDJ") acquired all of Tract B and became the owner of the Woodlands Business 
Park Planned Unit Development (the "PUD"). [Defs.' Answers to PL's Interrogs., Answer to 
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Interrog. No. 4. R. at 269-271. Regarding the PUD, see Minutes of Planning Commission, 11-22-83 
acknowledging that the Woodlands Associates filed their application "as a PUD". R. at 224. See 
also Decl. of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions of the Woodlands Business Park, beginning at 
R. at 438, and Ex. "C" thereof, at R. at 484, 485.] 
5. Acquisition and Development of Tract C a. Beginning in 1996, certain parcels 
adjacent to Tract B called the "Northern Tract" and the "Northern Northern Tract" were acquired by 
Woodlands m and Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands IV"). [R. at 269-270.] Those parcels 
as assembled have, collectively, been referred to by the parties and the trial court as Tract C or the 
Expansion Property. [R. at 4; R. at 25-26. Supplemental Compl. f 3(d), R. at 402. Woodlands 
Business Park CC&R's, Sixth Amendment, R. at 486,488. As to reference as Tract C, see various 
pleadings in R., see page 3 of Order at R. at 663, Minute Entry, R. at 668.] 
b. Woodlands HI, Woodlands IV, JDJ, and The Woodlands Business Park Association (the 
"Woodlands Owners") constitute all of the owners of Tracts B and C. Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc. ("Wasatch"), by agreement with the Woodlands Owners, manages the PUD. [R. 
at 373-377.] 
c. Over the objection of Lutheran, Woodlands III sought and obtained a permit to construct 
Woodlands Tower m ("Tower HI"). [R. at 4-5, 78, 270.] To satisfy Salt Lake County parking 
requirements relative to Tower HI, a parking facility has been constructed on Tract C providing 453 
parking stalls for Tower HI and Tract B, and Grants of Easement have been made to provide for use 
of the parking facility for Tract B tenants and invitees. [R. at 217,271,664; Grant of Easement, R. 
at 503-509, see 504; Grant of Easement, R. at 511-518. R. at 577.] 
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d. A fourth office tower ("Tower IV") has been constructed by Woodlands IV on Tract C. 
[R. at 271, 563, 664.] 
6. County Required Access, Parking, a. Salt Lake County required, for the construction 
of Tower III on Tract B, that sufficient parking to support Tower III be available, and the Developers 
proposed or agreed that it be provided specifically through the construction of the parking structure 
on Tract C [By inference from Grant of Easement 3/12/97, ffifl and 4 referring to approval by S.L. 
County. R. at 503-504; 511-512; Parking requirements acknowledged on 6/7/96 R. at 577; 9/26/95 
S.L. County letter R. at 578.] The County also required, when it approved Tower EI that access be 
available to the parking facility from 900 East over the Easement. [R. at 578.] 
b. The Woodlands Business Park has been expanded to include Tract C. The multi-level 
parking facility and Tower IV are integrated into the PUD through a roadway system which is easily 
accessible from 900 East. [R. at 217, 468-469, 486, 488, 563, 584, 586.] As a condition to the 
approval of Tower IV, Salt Lake County required that parking in the multi-level facility on Tract C 
be provided, and that access to 900 East be left open from the parking structure. [R. at 577-578, 
580.] 
7. Tract C is Integrated into the PUD, and the Easement is Accessible from Tract C. 
a. Wasatch is the manager of the PUD. John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel of Wasatch, stated in his Affidavit that the PUD has two parking structures, 
including that on Tract C. He said: "Access to the parking structure which is situated northeast of 
Office Tower HI is via 700 East, 3900 South or the right of way from 900 East along the north 
boundary ofthe Lutheran High School property." [quoting from 1f8 thereof. R. at217-218.] Healso 
referred to attached photographs of the right of way on Tract A leading to the PUD, and of the 
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parking structure on Tract C. [R. at 220, 221. For the court's convenience, the Affidavit and its 
attached pictures are provided in the Addendum, as Exhibit C] 
b. Tract C is integrated into the PUD, is a part thereof, and the tenants and occupants of 
Tower IV on Tract C are able, by virtue of the integrated and indivisible system of roadways, to 
access Tract C by use of the Easement. [R. at 217,220,221,420,468-469,486,488, 536, 538-539. 
See Plat map showing roadways prior to expansion, R. at 530. Addendum: Ex. B. (A map of the 
PUD showing the roadway system as it is today was used at argument for demonstrative purposes, 
but was not made part of the record).] 
8. Actual Use of Easement to Access Tract C. Persons using Tower III and Tower IV do 
in fact utilize the Easement to access the parking structure on Tract C, and to enter Tower m and/or 
Tower IV. [Davis Aff. and Swanson Aff, R. at 583-586.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Lutheran, as the owner of Tract A, contends that the Easement is being misused by the 
Woodlands Owners, the owners of Tract B, and the tenants and subtenants of the Woodlands Owners 
as well as their customers, invitees and guests. Tract B is the dominant estate. It abuts and is 
appurtenant to Tract A, the servient estate. Tract B was developed as a Planned Unit Development 
as permitted by Salt Lake County. 
After acquiring the various planned unit parcels during the 1990's, the Woodlands Owners 
acquired and/or joined with related entities to acquire property adjacent to and north of Tract B, 
known as Tract C. Due to the various benefits (size, additional acreage, room for parking, etc.) 
afforded by the adjacent property, Tract C was added to the PUD. Two new office towers, one on 
Tract B (Tower III) and one on Tract C (Tower IV), and a multi-level parking facility on Tract C 
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have been constructed and joined into the PUD. Access is provided over the roadway system of the 
expanded PUD to the parking facility on Tract C, for the benefit of both Tower HI and Tower IV, 
as well as the rest of the PUD. The roadway system provides access to the Easement. As a result, 
the authorized uses of the Easement have been so intertwined with the unauthorized uses 
(attributable to the non-dominant, non-appurtenant Tract C), that the wrongful activities cannot be 
separated from the appropriate uses. 
This is a matter involving legal issues of first impression in the state of Utah. Because this 
case involves indivisibly intertwined authorized and unauthorized uses of an easement, we are 
confronted by a fact circumstance which arises infrequently. 
The law of other jurisdictions in the United States reveals a "bright line" rule which appears 
to govern all but one jurisdiction. The bright line rule has been succinctly stated as follows: 
The dominant owner may not use an appurtenant easement to benefit any property 
other than the dominant estate. An attempted extension of the easement to serve non-
dominant land represents an overburden of the servient tenement, regardless of the 
amount of usage. Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr. The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land. §8:11. f832 (2001). 
Lutheran submits that the facts in the light most favorable to it, as responding party, do not 
support a judgment as a matter of law for Respondents. Furthermore, if Utah does not adopt the 
bright line rule, Lutheran submits that there remain the numerous material questions of fact, which 
would include, inter alia, the intent of the parties who created the Easement, whether an expansion 
of the dominant estate has occurred, whether expansion was anticipated, what would constitute 
normal development for Tract B, what the resulting burden on the Easement would be, and what 
burden is actually being borne by Tract A. Even if the law of Utah is that which is set forth by the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut (which recognized an exception to the bright line rule), there are 
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obvious material questions of fact which must be resolved in a trial. These factual issues include the 
parties' intent, the nature and extent of the burden on the Easement, and the character of the Tract 
B development. 
Lutheran also submits that, if the Court chooses to apply the bright line rule, there are no 
material fact questions, and a misuse of the servient estate exists, as a matter of law. On that basis, 
Lutheran is entitled to summary judgment, and the Woodlands Owners, and each of them, should 
be enjoined from using the Easement, or their easement rights should be extinguished. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction. Woodlands Business Park is so designed that there is no practical way to 
separate the use of the Easement derived from the dominant Tract B, from that derived from the 
expansion Tract C. The construction of Tower HI on the Tract B dominant estate would not have 
been legally or practically possible but for the additional parking available on Tract C. By design, 
the parking facility and Tower IV on Tract C are integrated into the PUD and its roadway system 
and, therefore, the occupants and invitees of those buildings have unrestricted access to the Easement 
through the common roadways of the PUD. 
I. SINCE THIS IS A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION, ALL APPLICABLE LAW 
SHOULD BE EXAMINED. 
The law in Utah is silent in respect to expansion of the dominant estate, and/or extension of 
an easement to non-dominant land. The issues presented on this appeal will therefore be a matter 
of first impression for the appellate courts of the state of Utah. It is relevant and appropriate to 
consider the law which does exist in the state of Utah regarding planned unit developments and 
easements, and how courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with the issue at hand. 
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A. Planned Unit Developments in Salt Lake County. The term, "planned unit 
development (PUD)" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) as "an area with a 
specified minimum contiguous acreage to be developed as a single entity according to a plan, 
containing one or more . . . commercial or industrial areas." 
The Salt Lake County Ordinances in effect in 1983 when the Declaration was created defined 
planned unit development to "mean an integrated design for development of residential, commercial, 
or industrial uses, or combination of such uses, in which one or more of the regulations, other than 
use regulations,... is waived or varied to allow flexibility and initiate site and building design and 
location in accordance with an approved plan and imposed general requirements as specified in this 
Chapter." Salt Lake County, Utah, Ordinance §22-31-3(3) (1981). It further provided in §22-31-
3(4) " . . . A planned unit development permit shall not be granted unless the planned unit 
development meets the use limitations of the zoning district in which it is to be located and meets 
the density and other limitations of such districts. Compliance with the regulations of this Ordinance 
in no sense excuses the developer from the applicable requirements of the Subdivision Ordinance, 
except as modifications thereof are specifically authorized in the approval of the application for the 
planned unit development." 
Section 22-31-3(5) sets forth the "Required Conditions", among which are the following: 
3. The development shall be in single, partnership, or corporate 
ownership, or under option to purchase by an individual or a corporate entity at the 
time of application or the application shall be filed jointly by all owners of the 
property. 
4. The Planning Commission shall require such arrangement of 
structures and open spaces within the site development plan, as necessary, to assure 
that adjacent properties will not be adversely affected. 
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a. Height and intensity of buildings and uses shall be arranged, 
around the boundaries of the planned unit development, to be 
compatible with existing adjacent developments or zones. 
c. Density of dwelling units per acre shall be the same as 
allowed in the zone in which the planned unit development is located. 
See also §22-31-3(6) in which the applicant is required to submit a plan for the total area which will 
show, among other things, 
1. The use or uses, dimensions, sketch elevations, and locations of 
proposed structures. 
2. Dimensions and locations of areas to be reserved and developed for 
vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking,... and other open spaces. 
A copy of §22-31 -3, from the Salt Lake County Ordinances which were in effect in 1983, is attached 
to the Addendum as Exhibit E. Amendments to Salt Lake County's Ordinances were adopted in 
1984, with no changes which are material to the issues addressed above. Nonetheless, a copy of the 
ordinances as changed in 1984 is also attached for the court's easy reference, as part of that Exhibit. 
B. Easement Case Law in Utah. The parties agree that the Easement is an easement 
appurtenant. "An easement appurtenant is a privilege whereunder the owner of one tenement (the 
dominant estate) has rights to enjoy, in respect to that tenement, in or over the tenement of another 
person (the servient estate)." Ernst v. Allen, 184 P 827,829 (Utah 1919). An appurtenant easement 
'"inheres in the [grantee's] land, concerns the premises, and pertains to its enjoyment. It is incapable 
of existence separate from the particular land to which it is annexed'" (emphasis added). Johnson 
v. Higlev. 1999 UT App. 278,989 P.2d 61,67, quoting 25 Am. Jur. IdEasements and Licenses f 10 
(1996). 
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It is settled in Utah that, when an easement is created by an express grant, the interpretation 
or analysis is governed by that grant. The grant defines the extent of the burden which will be 
permitted. 
Ordinarily the purpose of granting a right of way over land, rather than making an 
outright conveyance of it, is to retain the ownership in the servient estate . . . and to 
allow a privilege of limited use to the dominant estate The accepted rule is that 
the language of the grant is the measure and the extent of the right created; and that 
the easement conveyed should be so construed as to burden the servient estate only 
to the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose described in the grant, (emphasis 
added, footnote omitted) Weggeland v. Uiifusa, 14 Utah. 2d 364,365-366,384 P.2d 
590, 591 (Utah 1963). See also Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310, 173 P. 564 (1918). 
In 1982, in the matter of Wvkoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756 (Utah 1982) the court said: 
This Court has on a number of occasions considered and defined easements based on 
deeds and grants, and it is clear that a right-of-way founded on a deed or grant is 
limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument. Id., at 758. 
See also Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351 (1952), and Nielson v. Sandburg, 105 Utah 
93, 141 P.2d 696 (1943). 
The owner of a servient estate may use the servient estate in any manner and for any purpose 
consistent with the enjoyment of the easement, and the dominant estate cannot interfere with that 
use. See Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 81 Utah 355 18 P.2d 292 (1933). Also in Stevens, the Utah court 
acknowledged the rule that"... in construing instruments creating easements in land, the court will 
look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing 
granted, and the object to be attained, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties." 
Stevens was cited favorably in Wood, a case in which the court was considering a reservation 
of a right of way in a warranty deed and the later partition of the dominant estate. The court also 
said: 
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It is true, as stated by Appellant, that a right of way appurtenant to an estate is 
appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the owners of every part. 
"Nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement cannot create a further or 
additional easement across a servient tenement, and an easement of way does not 
inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on 
the way; and where the resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, 
the right to the easement will be extinguished." Wood, 253 P.2d at 354 (Utah 1952). 
citing 28 C.J.S., Easements, §65(b), at 732. 
The Wood court found that the parcel which had been partitioned from the dominant estate and 
which did not abut the servient estate was not appurtenant on its own, and therefore the use of the 
servient estate to provide access to the non-abutting partitioned estate would result in a substantial 
increase in the use of the servient estate, and that use was contrary to the use contemplated by the 
parties at the time of the grant. Use by the partitioned parcel would be a misuse of the easement. 
In June, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals favorably cited the Wood language in Alvev v. 
Mackelprang, 2002 UT App. 220, 51 P.3d 45,49 (2002). It affirmed the rule that"... an easement 
is extinguished when, after the division of the dominant tenement, a newly created parcel does not 
abut the servient tenement." (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted. IdL, at ^[15, 51 P.3d at 50.) 
The law of Utah demonstrated in these opinions relates to, but is not directly determinative 
of, the issues in this matter. Has the dominant estate been expanded to include Tract C, or has Tract 
C been improperly provided access to the Easement? In either case, has the Easement been misused? 
Those issues have been addressed in cases in numerous other jurisdictions. It is prudent to consider 
how those jurisdictions have dealt with the issues, and how treatises have explained the legal 
principles. 
C. The Bright Line Rule in Most Jurisdictions. The Law of Easements and Licenses in 
Land, at §8:11 states: 
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The dominant owner may not use an appurtenant easement to benefit any property 
other than the dominant estate. An attempted extension of the easement to serve non-
dominant land represents an overburden of the servient tenement, regardless of the 
amount of usage, (footnotes omitted) 
In respect to expansion of the dominant estate, that treatise reports: 
An easement appurtenant to one parcel cannot be used in connection with another 
parcel. The owner of a dominant estate may not extend the easement to 
accommodate land that the servitude was not originally intended to serve. Hence, an 
easement appurtenant does not benefit nondominant land that the easement holder 
now owns or property that the easement holder may subsequently acquire. The 
purpose of this rule is to prevent an increase of the burden on the servient estate, 
(footnotes omitted) Id, at §2:8. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) §4.11 (2000) provides as follows: 
§4.11 Use of Appurtenant Easement or Profit to Serve Property Other Than 
Dominant Estate. 
Unless the terms of the servitude determined under §4.1 provide 
otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may not be used for the 
benefit of property other than the dominant estate. 
Comment: 
b. Appurtenant easement cannot be used to serve non-dominant estate. 
Under the rule stated in this section, unless otherwise provided an appurtenant 
easement cannot be used to serve property other than the dominant estate. The 
rationale is that use to serve other property is not within the intended purpose of the 
servitude. This rule reflects the likely intent of the parties by setting an outer limit 
on the potential increase in use of an easement brought about by normal development 
of the dominant estate, permitted under the rules stated in §4.10. Where it applies, 
the rule avoids otherwise difficult litigation over the question whether increased use 
unreasonably increases the burden on the servient estate. 
. . . Under the rule stated in §2.5, a servitude can be created to benefit 
any land, but if the intent to benefit land owned by another, or land to be acquired in 
the future, is not clearly apparent, the usual presumption, embodied in the rule stated 
in this section, is that the dominant estate is limited to land owned by the grantee at 
the time the easement or profit is created. 
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Unless the easement or profit was intended to benefit land to be 
acquired in the future, the easement beneficiary is not entitled to use it to serve land 
that is subsequently acquired even if no additional use of the easement or burden on 
the servient estate would ensue. 
In respect to the above Comment b, it is noted: 
Appurtenant easement cannot be used to serve non-dominant estate, Comment b. 
The rule stated in this section is widely supported by modern authority: (citations 
omitted) [Restatement. §4.11 Reporter's Note (2000)]4 
See also 7 Thompson on Real Property, §60.04(a)(l)(ii) (David A. Thomas, ed., 2d ed., 
1994). 
Ohio. Prominently referred to in the treatises for articulation of the bright line rule is State 
ex rel. Fisher v. McNutt 597 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). That court said: 
. . . it is well known that the law in Ohio, and undoubtedly in every State of the 
United States, is that one having an easement by grant may assign that easement with 
the dominant estate, and the easement goes to every portion of the dominant estate 
assigned, but can go no further. . . . 
It is universal and well known that if one acquires a right-of-way to one lot 
or parcel of land, he or she cannot use it to gain access to that parcel and thence over 
his or her own land to other lands belonging to him or her. (emphasis added) LI, at 
543 (quoting from App., Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 2.) 
McNutt involved the claim of the State of Ohio that it could ". . . use its easement located on 
appellants' property to provide forest management not only for the 77.7 acres owned by the original 
grantor of the easement, but also for the additional 4,764.6 acres of adjacent property." Id, at 541. 
The easement was for road purposes, and the state claimed that the use to access the additional 
4
 After a review and discussion of seventeen (17) cases demonstrating that "wide 
support", the Reporter acknowledged that "[a] few recent cases may indicate a shift from the rule 
stated in this section, which essentially creates a presumption that after-acquired property was not 
intended to benefit from the easement, to one that is neutral where no material increase in use of 
the easement will result." The Reporter then referred to the Connecticut cases discussed below. 
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property would not constitute an unreasonable increase in burden to the servient estate. The court 
quoted the general rule of law from a previous Ohio case (citation omitted) as follows: 
An easement can be used only in connection with the estate to which it is appurtenant 
and cannot be extended by the owner to any other property which he may then own 
or afterward acquire, unless so provided in the instrument by which the easement is 
created, and the fact that such property is within the same enclosure as the lot to 
which the easement is appurtenant makes no difference in the application of the rule. 
Accordingly, a right of way cannot be used by the owner of the dominant tenement 
to pass to other land or premises adjacent to or beyond that to which the easement is 
appurtenant.... Id., at 542. 
It also favorably quoted two treatises as follows: 
"No man can impose a new restriction or burden on his neighbor by his own act, and 
for this reason. An owner of an easement cannot, by altering his dominant tenement, 
increase his right." 
"The law is perfectly settled, if one man has a right of way over land of another,.. 
. to go to a particular place, he cannot use it for the purpose of going to a place 
beyond it, because the servient tenant is only subject to a certain inconvenience." 
(citations omitted) IdL 
In McNutt, the trial court had found for the State on the basis that the easement was ambiguous 
because it did not say whether it was for the sole benefit of the property belonging to the original 
grantee. The Ohio appellate court overruled stating that, "[c]ontrary to the court's finding of silence, 
we find the grant speaks loudly as to which property was to benefit from the easement" Id, at 542-
543. 
Arizona. Another frequently cited case is DND Neffson Co. v. Galleria Partners, 745 P.2d 
206 (Ariz. App. 1987). Its facts are strikingly similar to those before this court. The Defendant in 
DND Neffson was constructing a shopping mall on two parcels of land. One parcel fronted Oracle 
Road. The other, referred to by the court as the "Foster parcel", was adjacent to the first parcel and 
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accessible by an easement over Tucson Mall Ring Road, which easement was granted to the mall 
owner's predecessor by the Plaintiff. The plans permitted access to the entire mall by use of the 
easement which had been granted for the benefit of the Foster Parcel only. "The trial court granted 
summary judgment and entered an injunction prohibiting use of the easement until such time as the 
mall was altered to prevent use of the easement by those utilizing that portion of the mall not on the 
dominant estate." Id at 207. The mall developer contended that questions of fact remained and that 
the injunction was inappropriate as premature. The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed, saying: 
The law is clear that an easement appurtenant to a parcel of land, the dominant 
parcel, may not be used to benefit another parcel of land to which the easement is not 
appurtenant even though the two parcels are adjacent and under common ownership. 
Penn Bowling Recreation Center, Inc. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 
1949); McCullough v. Broad Exch. Co., 101 App. Div. 566, 92 N.Y.S. 533 (1905), 
affd, 184 N.Y. 592,77N.E. 1191 (1906). The only building plans before this court 
show clearly that patrons from the non-dominant parcel will have access to the 
easement through the dominant parcel, thus benefitting from the easement 
improperly. Id 
The mall owner argued that a question of fact existed regarding the extent of the burden. The 
court said: 
. . . However, we are not here concerned with the extent of the burden, i.e. with the 
actual amount of pedestrian and automobile traffic using the easement. An easement 
can be overburdened either by overuse or by improper use. 
It is elementary law that an easement cannot be extended by the 
owner of the dominant tenement to the other land owned by him 
adjacent to or beyond the land to which it is appurtenant, for such an 
extension would constitute an unreasonable increase of the burden of 
the servient tenement. 
[citing] Kanefskv v. Dratch Constr. Co., 376 PA. 188, 195, 101 A. 2d 923, 926 
(1954) (footnote omitted). The easement granted to appellant was expressly "for the 
benefit of the Foster Parcel. . .". Having planned the mall to permit unrestricted 
access to the easement by the non-dominant parcel, appellant is in no position to 
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contend that that which it planned, a plain misuse, will not be used. Accordingly, 
injunctive relief was not premature, (emphasis added) 745 P.2d at 207. 
District of Columbia. See also Penn Bowling, 179 F.2d 64. The facts in that case involved 
a development by the owner of the dominant estate upon the dominant estate and adjacent property 
which could be accessed by the easement. The court ruled: 
So where it cannot be ascertained whether the easement of a right of way is being 
used solely for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement, or for additional property 
also, an injunction maybe granted against further use of the easement until such time 
as it may be shown that only the dominant tenement is served by the easement, 
(citation omitted) Id., at 67. 
Illinois. In McCann v. R. W. Dunteman Co., 609 N.E. 2d 1076 (111. App. Ct. 1993), the trial 
court enjoined use of the easement in question to access parcels beyond the dominant estate. The 
dominant estate owner contended that it was entitled to the use of the easement to access its other 
parcels in order to enable it to fully enjoy the dominant estate. After reciting the basic principles 
regarding appurtenant easements, and the law that the easement may not be extended to 
accommodate other lands for which the easement was not originally intended, the court found that 
the proposed use of the easement would not enhance the normal development of the dominant parcel, 
and that carrying traffic to other parcels was not necessary for the dominant parcel's normal 
development. 
Tennessee. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, considering use of an easement over farm land 
to access adjacent land, ruled that: 
The owner of an easement "cannot materially increase the burden of it upon the 
servient estate or impose thereon a new and additional burden." . . . Enlarging an 
easement to include adjoining tracts does increase the burden. "An easement for the 
benefit of one land cannot be enlarged and extended to other adjoining lands to which 
no right is attached." (emphasis added) McCammon v. Meredith. 830 S.W.2d 577, 
580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
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Massachusetts. In a case involving an attempt by the town of Amherst, Mass., to connect 
an easement to another roadway, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held 
It also is the long established rule in the Commonwealth, as elsewhere, that after-
acquired property, such as the locus, may not be added to the dominant estate . . . 
without the express consent of the owner of the servient estate . . . [and] absent such 
consent, the use of an easement to benefit property located beyond the dominant 
estate constitutes an overburdening of the easement, (citations omitted) McLaughlin 
v.Bd. of Selectmen. 664 N.E. 2d 786, 790 (Mass. 1996). 
Other Jurisdictions. There are numerous other jurisdictions in which the rule applies. See 
also the following cases of other jurisdictions consistent with the bright line rule: Hunt v. Pole 
Bridge Hunting Club, 631 N. Y.S. 2d 711 (N.Y App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995): Schadewald v. Brule. 570 
N.W. 2d 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Soergel v. Preston, 367 N.W. 2d 366 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) 
[in Soergel an injunction was granted, and the defendants argued that a permanent injunction was 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The appellate court recognized that the injunction would 
cause expense and hardship, but observed that"... plaintiffs' advance written and verbal warnings 
to defendants should have put defendants on notice as to the possible consequences...". Id, at 590]; 
Lyons v. Lyons, 371 S.E. 2d 640 (W. Va. 1988); Ratcliff v. Cvrus, 544 S.E. 2d 93 (W. Va. 2001); 
Walton v. Holland, 385 S.E. 2d 609 (Va. 1989); Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W. 2d 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1977); Leffmgwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 916 P.2d 751 (Mont. 1996); Selvia v. Reitmever, 295 N.E. 
2d 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Holmstrom v. Lee, 26 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Watson v. 
Lazy Six Corp., 608 So.2d 389 (Ala. 1992); Kanefskv, 101 A.2d 923; Wall v. Rudolph, 198 Cal. 
App. 2d 684, 695 18 Cal. Rptr. 123, 3 ALR 3d 1242 (Cal. App. 2d. Dist. 1961); Knotts v. The 
Summit Park Co., 126 A. 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1924); and Lazy Dog Ranch v. Tellurav Ranch Corp, 
965 P.2d 1229, see dicta at 1234, 1238 and 1241 (Colo. 1998). 
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D. Connecticut: the exception to the rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court, while it 
acknowledges the general bright line rule described above and that the rule is followed by most 
jurisdictions, has decided to carve out an exception. See II Giardino, LX.C. v. The Belle Haven 
Land Co., 757 A.2d 1103 (Conn. 2000) and Abington Ltd. P'ship v. Heublein. 778 A.2d 885 (Conn. 
2001). The Connecticut Supreme Court observed: 
We previously have departed from that general rule [referring to §4.11, and comment 
b., thereof, of Restatement] where the purpose of the rule would not have been served 
by disallowing the use of an easement appurtenant. Thus, we carved out an exception 
where the dominant estate was simply being enlarged by the subsequent acquisition 
of an adjoining parcel by the owner of the dominant estate, (explanation and 
emphasis supplied) II Giardino, at 1111. 
The Connecticut court went on to explain that it had decided to permit the addition of land to the 
dominant estate, without extinguishing the easement or giving rise to a right to an injunction, if it 
is a "mere addition of other land to the dominant estate", and "where the extended use of the 
easement to the benefit of the non-dominant estate would not result in a material increase in the use 
of the servient estate, in other words an additional burden to the servient estate." Id., at 1112-1113. 
The court in II Giardino dealt with facts involving a third party, which did not own the 
dominant estate, and concluded ". . . that the expanded use of an easement appurtenant by the 
dominant estate to benefit a non-dominant estate, not owned by the dominant estate owner, 
constitutes, as a matter of law, an impermissible overburdening of the servient estate." Id, at 1113. 
In Connecticut, therefore, the exception applies only if the owner of the dominant parcel owns the 
expansion parcel. 
In Heublein (the second of two opinions in the same matter), the court considered at length 
the factual background pertaining to the use of a mountain near the town of Avon, Connecticut, 
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where a science center had been constructed. The easement in that case provided access to the 
mountain property, which had been acquired by the science center from the United States 
Government (the "federal parcel"). Later, the science center acquired a parcel of adjacent land on 
the mountain from the state (the "state parcel"). The state parcel had historically been associated 
with the federal parcel pursuant to a written lease agreement. The science center had constructed 
a building on the state parcel, and the court pointed out that the building contained broadcasting 
equipment to enable the science center to create and broadcast educational programs. It observed 
that, as a result, the new building actually served to reduce the amount of traffic over the easement, 
because students would no longer need to visit the science center in person to benefit from its 
facilities. See Heublein, 778 A2d at 888-895. The Connecticut court reviewed the principles which 
it had adopted regarding the application of the established bright line rule. It said that it had rejected 
the rule of a per se exclusion of the after-acquired property from a dominant estate, and that they had 
. . . adopted instead the principle that the construction of an easement requires inquiry 
into the intent of the parties when the easement was created . . . . To determine that 
intent, we held, a court reasonably may take into account the proposed use and the 
likely development of the dominant estate, (citations omitted) We cautioned, 
however, that, "under no circumstances . . . could an easement be construed to 
encompass after acquired property if the result would be a material increase in the 
use of the servient property. " (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted, citations 
omitted) Id, at 892-893. 
In the Heublein matter, the court considered the complex history of interrelations between the state 
parcel and the federal parcel and facts which led to its conclusion that the easement does not 
overburden the servitude, and further concluded that it was ". . . persuaded that it necessarily was 
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the creation of the easement over 
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Montevideo Road that the benefits of that easement might accrue to adjacent property not formally 
within the terms of the easement." Id., at 893. 
The Connecticut court, as demonstrated above, is not bound strictly to the written grant of 
the easement, but will instead consider indicators that expansion might have been contemplated, 
although not stated in the grant, and the effect of expansion on the burden placed upon the servient 
estate, in the course of making a decision as to whether an injunction should be issued. If the court 
is able to find that the extension to additional property was anticipated, and that the burden on the 
servient estate would not materially be increased, in Connecticut the use will not be enjoined, despite 
the limitation in the grant. 
E. Remedy: Injunctive Relief or Extinguishment. As is apparent from the foregoing, 
almost all of the courts in other jurisdictions have generally held that the use of an easement to 
access a non-appurtenant, non-dominant parcel would be enjoined. Whereas, in the DND Neffson 
and Penn Bowling matters, the expansion or extension is so integrated that it cannot effectively be 
enjoined, all use of the easement in question has been enjoined, or the right to the easement 
extinguished. DND Neffson, 745 P.2d at 207; Penn Bowling, 179 F.2d at 67. Where the court finds 
that use can be restricted to the dominant estate, the courts have enjoined the particular expanded 
use. See McNutt 597 N.E.2d at 543; Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 796-797. 
The remedy in the event of a breach of the established bright line rule of law is set forth in 
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, §10:26, as follows: 
If the easement holder misuses the servitude, the servient estate owner may generally 
obtain an injunction restraining the overburden. However, an easement holder may 
misuse an easement in such a way that a court cannot separate the wrongful activity 
from appropriate usage for purposes of issuing an injunction. In such unusual cases, 
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Montevideo Road that the benefits of that easement might accrue to adjacent property not formally 
within the terms of the easement." Id., at 893. 
The Connecticut court, as demonstrated above, is not bound strictly to the written grant of 
the easement, but will instead consider indicators that expansion might have been contemplated, 
although not stated in the grant, and the effect of expansion on the burden placed upon the servient 
estate, in the course of making a decision as to whether an injunction should be issued. If the court 
is able to find that the extension to additional property was anticipated, and that the burden on the 
servient estate would not materially be increased, in Connecticut the use will not be enjoined, despite 
the limitation in the grant. 
E. Remedy: Injunctive Relief or Extinguishment. As is apparent from the foregoing, 
almost all of the courts in other jurisdictions have generally held that the use of an easement to 
access a non-appurtenant, non-dominant parcel would be enjoined. Whereas, in the DND Neffson 
and Penn Bowling matters, the expansion or extension is so integrated that it cannot effectively be 
enjoined, all use of the easement in question has been enjoined, or the right to the easement 
extinguished. DND Neffson, 745 P.2d at 207; Penn Bowling, 179 F.2d at 67. Where the court finds 
that use can be restricted to the dominant estate, the courts have enjoined the particular expanded 
use. See McNutt 597 N.E.2d at 543; Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 796-797. 
The remedy in the event of a breach of the established bright line rule of law is set forth in 
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, §10:26, as follows: 
If the easement holder misuses the servitude, the servient estate owner may generally 
obtain an injunction restraining the overburden. However, an easement holder may 
misuse an easement in such a way that a court cannot separate the wrongful activity 
from appropriate usage for purposes of issuing an injunction. In such unusual cases, 
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a court may declare the easement terminated in order to eliminate the overburden 
on the servient estate. 
An easement may also be lost by misuse when the owner of the dominant estate 
acquires adjacent property not entitled to enjoyment of the easement and constructs 
a building occupying both parcels. If use of the easement related to the portion of the 
building on the non-dominant property cannot be separated from use related to the 
part of the structure on the dominant estate, the easement may be terminated. 
However, a court may choose instead to grant in injunction against any use of the 
easement pending alteration of the building to eliminate the overburden. [Citing, in 
a footnote, Penn Bowling, 179 F.2d, at 67 and DND Neffson. 745 P.2d, at 207.] 
Although the concept that an easement may be extinguished by misuse has been 
recognized by many courts and commentators, it has rarely been employed to 
terminate a servitude. Nonetheless, the doctrine is founded on sound equitable 
principles and should not be ignored or rejected merely because cases calling for its 
application arise infrequently. 
II. UTAH SHOULD ADOPT THE BRIGHT LINE RULE. 
The law in Utah is consistent with that of all other jurisdictions in the United States which 
prohibit the overburdening of a servient estate. The Utah courts have historically provided for the 
protection of the rights of the owner of the servient estate. In fact, only recently, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has reaffirmed the notion, established 50 years ago, that a parcel partitioned from a 
dominant estate, which does not abut the servient estate, shall not retain an interest in the easement 
which had previously served the dominant estate. Alvey, 2002 UT App. 220, 51 P.3d 45. 
In Wood, quoting a principle from Corpus Juris Secondum. the court pointed out that the 
partitioning of the dominant estate, unless anticipated by the parties, would create a "further or 
additional easement across a servient tenement", and referred to the "resulting use [which] will 
increase the burden upon the servient estate". Id. In stating the standard in Alvey, the Court of 
Appeals noted: 
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First, after the division of the dominant tenement, an additional or further easement 
cannot be created across the servient tenement. See Wood, 253 P.2d at 354. Second, 
there cannot be any increase in the burden upon the servient tenement after the 
division, [citation omitted] Third, the easement must be reasonably necessary for 
use and convenient enjoyment of the dominant tenement. See Id. Finally, upon the 
division of the dominant tenement, the newly created parcel must "abut on the way." 
Wood, 253 P.2d at 354. Alvev. 2002 UT App. at 1J13, 51 P.3d at 50. 
By virtue of the foregoing, the Utah court has provided guidance and certainty to property 
owners in the state of Utah. The court has established a bright line rule - for all cases where the 
dominant estate has been partitioned - reducing the need for litigation regarding the reasonableness 
of the proposed use, and minimizing speculation regarding the use which may result. The lack of 
a bright line rule would, it is submitted, invite unnecessary litigation, and contribute to crowding of 
the courts, as parties try to persuade courts of the merits of their interests, and adduce evidence 
regarding various manners in which a burden might theoretically be measured. 
For the same legal and policy reasons which validate the Alvev holding, the Utah courts 
should adopt a bright line rule in cases where the dominant estate has been expanded. The rule 
should be that which is followed by most jurisdictions and is consistent with the standards already 
established by Utah courts for the protection of the interests of the servient estate. That rule would 
likewise provide certainty to landowners. A good discussion regarding the precedential merits of 
the rule may be found in a Washington Law Review article. The author argues essentially three 
points: 
1. "The reasonableness test diminishes the rights of servient owners". By not 
using the classic rule, courts deny protection to the servient parcel owner by permitting 
parties to litigate about the extent and reasonableness of the change and the effect on the 
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burden. To not use the bright line rule essentially emphasizes "the rights of the dominant 
parcel." 
2. Failure to apply the classic rule as a bright line increases litigation and 
uncertainty. 
3. "Bright line" application of the classic rule protects legitimate expectations 
and property rights. Pamela McClaran, Extending the Benefit of an Easement: A Closer 
Look at a Classic Rule, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 295, at 307-310 (1987). 
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land acknowledged the issue as discussed in the 
McClaran article, and an article in the Santa Clara Law Review5, (in which the author asserts that 
the rule should be abandoned for a standard which focuses on the reasonableness of the increased 
burden). The Bruce treatise commented in a footnote that "[S]uch a change, however, would 
substitute an imprecise standard for a clear and easily applied rule. " (emphasis added) Bruce §2:8, 
n.l. 
It is readily apparent that the Connecticut courts' abandonment of the strict rule has already 
resulted in numerous appeals in Connecticut. In each case, the court finds it necessary to review, at 
length, the factual circumstances and issues and to weigh the equities and burden. Furthermore, it 
is apparent from those cases that, at trial, the parties have found it necessary to adduce a great deal 
of evidence before the court to attempt to establish changes in the burden which would result or have 
resulted, and then to argue about, essentially, the reasonableness of those changes. It is observed that 
5
 Kratovil, Easement Law and Service of Non-Dominant Tenements: Time for a Change, 
24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 649 (1984). 
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the other jurisdictions, having applied the classic rule as a "bright line", seldom see appeals on the 
issue again. 
It would be consistent with Utah's law regarding appurtenant easements, and its history of 
providing clear and strict guidance for the protection of servient estates (see Wood, 122 Utah 580, 
253 P.2d 351, and Alvey, 2002 UT App. 220,5 lP.3d 45), if Utah were to adopt the so-called classic 
rule as set forth in the Restatement, supra, in Bruce, supra, and as clearly enunciated by the Arizona 
court in DND Neffson, 745 P.2d 206. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In order for Respondents to be awarded judgment, the trial court must determine that there 
is no material question of fact, that, based upon the record before it: (a) there has been no connection 
of a non-dominant parcel to the Easement and that the dominant estate has not been expanded; or, 
(b) if such a connection or expansion was made, (i) it was permitted; or (ii) the connection or 
expansion, resulting in an extension of the easement to a non-dominant parcel has been made, but 
is permitted by an exception to the rule of law. Lutheran submits that, in this matter, one cannot 
draw any of the those conclusions. 
The Trial Court's Analysis. The key provisions of the trial court's Order are set forth 
above, in Disposition by Trial Court. A copy of the Order, together with the Minute Entry dated 
April 26, 2002, (R. at 661-671) is attached to the Addendum, at Exhibit D. Using the same terms 
as those which are defined and used in this brief, the trial court described its analysis as follows: 
The current dispute revolves around a contiguous parcel of land owned by 
Woodlands IV and located immediately north of Tract B ('Tract C"). Tract C is an 
expansion of the original development and contains both a high-rise office building 
("Tower IV") and a multi-level parking facility. Currently, Tract B tenants, working 
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the requirements of Salt Lake County for parking, from the arrangements that the parking facility be 
constructed on Tract C to provide parking for Tower III, and the County's requirement that access 
be available from 900 East over the Easement. It is evident that the owners of Tract B could not 
have gained approval for such density of use, if they had not obtained the ability to expand to Tract 
C. There is no evidence in the record to the contrary.) 
1. There Has Been a Connection or Expansion. Whether it is characterized as a 
connection or an unauthorized expansion of the dominant estate, there is no question that Tract C 
has access to the Easement. There is clear, undisputed evidence of use of the Easement by persons 
occupying or visiting Towers HI and IV, who also utilize the parking facility on Tract C. [See 
Statement of Facts, 7.] It is further evident, from the record, that Salt Lake County, in granting 
approval for construction of the multi-level parking structure, also required that there be access to 
the structure from 900 East over the Easement. [Statement of Facts, 6.] Accordingly, and by design, 
the PUD has a system of integrated and interconnected roadways on the expanded development, 
which provide access from Tract C, as well as Tract B, to the Easement. 
2. No Evidence or Claim that the Connection has Been Permitted. There is no evidence 
before the Court that the connection to Tract C has been permitted. The trial court noted, in the 
Minute Entry, that both parties agree that the benefit of the Easement may not be enlarged to include 
Tract C. 
3. If the Utah Court Recognizes an Exception to the Rule that There Can be No Such 
Connection or Expansion Extending the Benefit of the Easement to Non-Dominant Property, 
There are Numerous Material Questions of Fact An exception to the bright line rule, such as that 
recognized by Connecticut, would require an examination of factual issues, which would necessarily 
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be material to the determination of whether the connection or expansion may be permitted as a 
matter of law. The use, itself, might be a question. The court might permit an examination of the 
unexpressed intent of the creators of the easement. Whether there has been or will be a material 
change or increase in the burden might be a question. In the light most favorable to Lutheran, the 
record is insufficient to support a judgment that an exception to the rule applies, as a matter of law. 
Are There Material Questions of Fact? 
The development of the PUD, especially that portion which includes Tower m, Tower IV, 
and the multi-level parking structure, and the resulting use, or availability for use, of the Easement, 
are so intermingled that there is no way to separate authorized uses from unauthorized uses of the 
Easement. The "tenants, concessionaires, customers, invitees and guests, and the concessionaires, 
invitees, customers and guests of any tenant or subtenant" [Decl. §4(d), on page 6, R. at 19] have 
clear, unrestricted access to the Easement, without regard to which building in the PUD they may 
have business. In the light most favorable to Lutheran, the inference of misuse is clear. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the tenants, concessionaires, and others associated 
with Tower IV are not entitled, as a matter of law, to use the Easement. Then, without evidentiary 
basis, the trial court apparently concluded that these persons would not use the Easement if they were 
advised not to do so. There is no credible evidence in the record from which the court might 
conclude that persons associated with Tower IV can effectively be prohibited from using the 
Easement. 
The facts before the court, with inferences in the light most favorable to Lutheran are that 
Tower in would not have been permitted to be constructed, but for the expansion of the development 
to include Tract C, and the construction of the parking facility thereon. See Statement of Facts, 6. 
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From Mark Brenchley's letter to Salt Lake County, it is clear that the County had required the 
provision of a certain number of parking stalls, based on a formula, for each building, including 
prospective Towers HI and IV. See also the County Ordinances, cited and summarized above. See 
especially §22-31-3(6), in which it is required that each phase of a planned unit development be of 
such size, composition and arrangement that its " . . . operation is feasible as a unit independent of 
any subsequent phases." It goes on to require that the plan show where parking will be provided. 
By reference to the Grant of Easement, it may reasonably be inferred, and must certainly be inferred 
in the light most favorable to Lutheran, that the Woodlands Owners proposed and the County 
accepted a plan that parking would be provided on Tract C. In fact, by the terms of the Grant of 
Easement, it was agreed between those parties that the required parking could not be moved to 
another location without the approval of Salt Lake County. [R. at 503-504; 511-512.] Salt Lake 
County also required that access be available from the multi-level parking facility to 900 East and 
that access thereto be open. [R. at 578.] Finally, it is evident that, in fact, tenants, concessionaires, 
and others do use the Easement to access the parking facility on Tract C, and from there Towers HI 
and IV. See Swanson Aff. and Davis Aff., R. at 583-586. 
There is no evidence in the record that Salt Lake County would have permitted either Tower 
IH or IV to be constructed, but for: 
(a) the association with the PUD, 
(b) the access to the parking on Tract C, 
(c) by inference, the additional density of use permitted due to the additional 
acreage represented by Tract C, and, finally, but very significantly, 
(d) access to 900 East over the Easement. 
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The facts, in the light most favorable to Lutheran, are that the dominant estate has been improperly 
expanded, or that the use of the Easement has been provided for the benefit of Tract C. 
B. There are Material Questions of Fact in Dispute, No Matter Which Law is Applied. 
The trial court, apparently concluding that no expansion had occurred, applied §4.10 of the 
Restatement, which states that"... the holder of an easement... is entitled to use the servient estate 
in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, 
frequency and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments and 
technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefitted 
by the servitude." (emphasis supplied) Lutheran respectfully submits that, based upon the foregoing 
examination of the law, the trial court applied the wrong rule. 
1. If Restatement §4.10 governs. Even if §4.10 was the standard of law to be 
applied by the court, and assuming arguendo there was no material question of fact in respect to 
expansion or providing access to non-dominant Tract C (see above), a material question of fact 
would still remain, to wit: what is the "normal development" of the dominant Tract B? 
There is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Tower III might have been 
constructed on Tract B as part of the normal development of that tract.6 Comment: a. to the above-
6
 Lutheran acknowledges and is cognizant of the argument of the Woodlands Owners that 
a notation was made in 1983, in a minute record of the County Planning Commission, regarding 
the intent of the then-dominant owner. It is submitted that the intent of the then-dominant owner, 
which did not own or, so far as we know, even contemplate owning, Tract C, is not material. 
Further, there is no evidence that Eugene Woodland was present, nor that he had agreed with or 
contemplated, on behalf of the Tract A owner, such development. If expansion was 
contemplated by both sides, they had a second "bite at the apple" when they amended the 
Declaration in 1984. They did not use the opportunity to address expansion. Finally, there is no 
evidence that the County would have permitted the sort of development which was being 
preliminarily considered. For purposes of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the inference in the 
light most favorable to Lutheran is that the owner of Tract A did not know, and that the county 
Page 33 
referenced §4.10 states: "The rules stated in this section apply only as an aid to determining the 
intent or expectations of the parties under the rules stated in §4.1 and to supply terms omitted by the 
parties in creating a servitude." Restatement, §4.10. The best evidence is the Declaration. The 
Declaration clearly sets forth the intent and expectations of the parties, especially when it and its 
inferences are considered in the light most favorable to Lutheran. Section 4(a) of the Declaration 
provides: 
Woodland (owner of Tract A) grants to Associates (owner of Tract B) a non-
exclusive easement appurtenant to and across Tract A for the purpose of allowing 
vehicular access between the public streets and any and all parking areas or roadways 
and lanes situated on Tract B; provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be 
limited to use for such purposes and to such extent as may be customary for use of 
Tract B for commercial purposes (including, but not limited to, reasonable and 
customary deliveries.... [R. at 18.] 
See also Declaration §8(a): 
Each and all of the easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions granted 
or created herein are appurtenances to the Tracts and none of the easements, 
covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions may be transferred, assigned or 
encumbered except as an appurtenance to such Tracts. For the purposes of the 
easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions created by this Declaration, 
the tract benefitted will constitute the dominant estate, and the Tract burdened by 
such easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions will constitute the 
servient estate. [R. at 20.] 
As is evident, there is no indication that "normal development" of Tract B would include after-
acquired property. At least, in the light most favorable to Lutheran, the Declaration did not 
contemplate expansion of Tract B. Therefore, there is not a factual basis upon which the 4.10 
would not have permitted such development. (In fact, the inference is also that Tract B's 
development, as of the time that the Woodlands Owners acquired it, had completed its normal 
permitted development.) Besides, that is not the way that the historical events unfolded. Tract C 
was acquired, and was used to expand the PUD. The dreams of the prior owner of Tract B are 
irrelevant. 
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Standard could be satisfied. If that is the law of Utah, the Woodlands Owners are not entitled to 
judgment. 
2. The Bright Line Rule. Section 4.11 of the Restatement as noted above, sets forth 
the rule which should have been applied by the court for purposes of considering the Woodlands 
Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Unless the terms of the servitude determined under Section 4.1 provide 
otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may not be used for the benefit 
of property other than the dominant estate. 
In comment b, it is noted 
. . . this rule reflects the likely intent of the parties by setting an outer limit on the 
potential increase in use of an easement brought about by normal development of the 
dominant estate, permitted under the rules stated in §4.10. Where it applies, the rule 
avoids otherwise difficult litigation over the question whether increased use 
unreasonably increases the burden on the servient estate. 
. . . under the rule stated in §2.5, a servitude can be created to benefit any land, but 
if the intent to benefit land owned by another, or land to be acquired in the future, is 
not clearly apparent, the usual presumption, embodied in the rule stated in this 
section, is that the dominant estate is limited to land owned by the grantee at the time 
the easement or profit is created. Id., cmt.b. 
In the light most favorable to Lutheran, the facts are that after-acquired property has been connected, 
by use thereof, to the dominant estate. See above. Those facts, alone, require application of the law 
as stated in §4.11, as well as that stated in §4.10. 
3. If Utah Applies the Connecticut Exception. If Utah law is to mirror the law 
announced by the Connecticut court, it is clear that there remain material questions of fact which 
would prevent summary judgment for the Woodlands Owners. As noted above, the Connecticut 
court in Heublein, adopted a principle ". . . that the construction of an easement requires inquiry into 
the intent of the parties when the easement was created. . . . To determine that intent... a court 
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reasonably may take into account the proposed use and the likely development of the dominant 
estate." (emphasis supplied) 778 A.2d. at 830. 
There is no evidence in the record regarding "the intent of the parties when the easement was 
created", other than that which is set forth in the Declaration. In discovery, the Woodlands Owners 
advised Lutheran that they had no special knowledge regarding the intent of the parties at the time 
the Declaration was entered into. (See Statement of Facts 3c.) See also the foregoing discussion 
regarding the normal development of Tract B. Based thereon, there is no evidence, especially 
considering the facts in a light most favorable to Lutheran, to support a conclusion that the parties 
to the Declaration intended or even contemplated expansion of the business park onto Tract C when 
they created the Easement. 
Furthermore, even if those issues were resolved, under the Connecticut exception, material 
questions of fact would remain regarding the burden on the servient estate. There is no evidence in 
the record which would support a finding regarding what an acceptable burden on Lutheran's 
servient estate would be, much less a finding of the extent of the burden which has resulted from the 
development of the PUD onto Tract C. The issues before the trial court centered upon the expansion 
or use of the Easement, and not upon the extent of the use. If the Connecticut exception is applied, 
there is no basis at law for summary judgment for the Woodlands Owners. 
The evidence is of misuse of the Easement. As is evident by reference to the Salt Lake 
County ordinances, the PUD is viewed by the County as an integrated parcel. The PUD development 
must be owned by one person or entity. [Salt Lake County Ordinance, §22-31-3(5)3.] The 
placement of structures is determined by the plan of development of the entire parcel. [Id., 
subsection (6).] As acknowledged by the trial court, Tract C has been added to the PUD. The 
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placement of Tower III, Tower IV, and the multi-level parking facility have each therefore been 
determined by the plan. Such a plan must provide for "vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking 
. . . and other open spaces." [Salt Lake County Ordinance, §22-31-3(6)2.] It is therefore 
undisputable that Tract C has been incorporated into that integrated design, and further that the 
development of Tract B, specifically Tower HI thereon, has been permitted in reliance upon the 
expansion of the PUD. If there is any material question about that fact, it is respectfully submitted 
that that question is a material question of fact which would prevent a ruling of summary judgment 
in favor of the Woodlands Owners. 
It therefore cannot be determined, as a matter of law, based upon the facts and inferences in 
the light most favorable to Lutheran, that the dominant estate has not been expanded and/or that the 
benefit associated with the use of the Easement has not been extended to Tract C. Such an 
expansion or extension, under the law, is improper, and should be enjoined. Furthermore, if the law 
of Utah is the Connecticut exception, that is, that the trial court should inquire into the intent of the 
parties and the extent of the burden which would result from the expansion or connection of a 
roadway to a non-dominant parcel, then material questions of fact clearly exist and remain to be 
tried. 
If not for the expansion, how could Tower HI have been constructed? 
How can it be expected that the tenants, concessionaires, customers, invitees and guests, 
associated with Tower IV will not use the easement? The parties and the court agree that they have 
no right to such use. Does not the mere connection of Tower IV to the easement through the PUD's 
integrated roadway system, in the light most favorable to Lutheran, create material questions of fact? 
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The trial court erred in its conclusion that the Woodlands Owners were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
IV. IF THE LAW IN UTAH FOLLOWS THE BRIGHT LINE RULE, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Lutheran respectfully submits that, if the Court of Appeals agrees that that law in the state 
of Utah follows the bright line, classic rule set forth in §4.11 of the Restatement, and described in 
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, §2:8, and §8:11, then the facts in dispute are 
immaterial to the legal issues. All material facts necessary for the application of the bright line rule 
are undisputed. 
A. The Easement Cannot Benefit Non-Dominant Tract C. 
1. The Rule. The Restatement, at §4.11 provides: 
Unless the terms of the servitude determined under Section 4.1 provide 
otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may not be used for the benefit 
of property other than the dominant estate. 
Comment b, explains 
b Appurtenant cannot be used to serve non-dominant estate, . . . if the 
intent to benefit land owned by another, or land to be acquired in the future, is not 
clearly apparent, the usual presumption, embodied in the rale stated in this section, 
is that the dominant estate is limited to land owned by the grantee at the time the 
easement or profit is created. 
Unless the easement or profit was intended to benefit land to be acquired in 
the future, the easement beneficiary is not entitled to use it to serve land that is 
subsequently acquired even if no additional use of the easement or burden on the 
servient estate would ensue. Id., cmt.b. 
Page 38 
By application of that rule, the court cannot find an intent to benefit Tract C; and where the Tract C 
land was not owned by the owners of Tract B at the time of the Declaration, the classic rule serves 
to establish a presumption that the Easement was not intended for that use. 
2. The Express Grant Solely for Tract B. The Easement across Tract A was 
created by an express grant in the provisions of the Declaration. Accordingly, any interpretation or 
analysis of the Easement should be governed by the Declaration. 
The accepted rule is that the language of the grant is the measure and the extent of 
the right created; and that the easement conveyed should be so construed as to 
burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose 
described in the grant, (emphasis added) Weggeland, 14 Utah. 2d at 364, 365-366, 
384P.2dat590,591. 
See also Wade, 52 Utah 310, 173 P. 564; Wvkoff 646 P.2d 756; and Wood, where the court said 
that". . . a deed should be construed so as to effectuate the intentions and desires of the parties, as 
manifested by the language made use of in the deed." (emphasis added) 122 Utah at 585, 253 P.2d 
at 353. 
The language which created the Easement has been examined previously in this Brief. 
Begging the court's indulgence for repetition, a few of the provisions bear amplification for the 
purpose of this argument. The Declaration provides: 
4. Grant of Easement. 
(a) Woodland grants to Associates a non-exclusive easement appurtenant 
to and across Tract A for the purpose of allowing vehicular access between the public 
streets and any and all parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract B 
provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be limited to use for such purposes 
and to such extent as may be customary/br use of Tract B for commercial purposes 
(including, but not limited to, reasonable and customary deliveries.... 
6. Modification. This Declaration and any easement, covenant, restriction or 
undertaking contained herein maybe terminated, extended, modified or amended as 
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to the whole of the Tracts of any portion of them, with the unanimous consent of the 
parties. 
7. Not a Public Dedication. Nothing contained in this Declaration will be 
deemed to be a gift or a dedication . . ., it being the intent of the parties that this 
Declaration be strictly limited to and for the purpose expressed herein [emphasis 
added]. 
8. Mutuality; Benefits and Burdens Run with Land. 
(a) Each and all of the easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and 
provisions granted or created herein are appurtenances to the Tracts and none of the 
easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions may be transferred, assigned 
or encumbered except as an appurtenance to such Tracts. For the purposes of the 
easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions created by this Declaration, 
the tract benefitted will constitute the dominant estate, and the Tract burdened by 
such easements, covenants, restrictions, rights and provisions will constitute the 
servient estate, (emphasis added) Decl., pages 5 and 7, R. at 18, 20. 
There can be no question about the purpose and intent of the parties to the Declaration, nor 
should there be any doubt about the scope and extent of the easement rights provided for the benefit 
of the dominant Tract B. The scope of the Easement and extent of the rights are clearly defined in 
the written provisions of the Declaration, as exhibited above. The owners of Tract B are permitted 
to have vehicular access across the easement on Tract A between the public streets and "parking 
areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract B". Decl., f 4(a). That access right is strictly limited 
to that purpose. Decl., %7. 
There is no ambiguity in the Declaration. 
The interpretation of an unambiguous deed is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, [citations omitted] Because the parties have not pointed to any 
ambiguity in the [deeds] granting the original easement, and - like the trial court -
we see none, the interpretation of the [deed] presents a question of law. Johnson, 
278,^11 989 P.2d at 66. 
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The trial court found that the expression of intent in the Declaration is clear. Minute Entry, 
page 2, R. at 668. There is no ambiguity. 
3, Expansion of PUD; Connection to Easement. The trial court found (Minute 
Entry, page 2, R. at 668) that the Woodlands Business Park PUD has been expanded to include Tract 
C. It is further clear that the buildings and parking facilities in the PUD are connected to one another 
for integrated circulation by internal roadways, and that access can be obtained from any parking 
facility within the PUD, including Tract C, to the Easement, and over the Easement to 900 East. See 
Statement of Facts 5, 6, 7, 8. 
4. Tract C (Whether Separate or a Part of the PUD) Benefits From the 
Easement. The uncontroverted facts on the record establish that Tract B was developed as a planned 
unit development. Salt Lake County treated the development and construction of Tower III and 
Tower IV, and the parking facility, as part of the integrated district, developed according to an 
approved plan. Approval was granted for the parking facility to serve Tower HI. Approval for 
Tower IV also relied on the parking facility. The County required that there be access to 900 East 
over the Easement. The PUD was expanded accordingly, by design, to include Tract C. As a result 
of the expansion, two high-rise office towers (Tower HI and Tower IV) and a multi-level parking 
facility to service them were added to the PUD development. Any occupant of or visitor to the PUD, 
including Tower HI, Tower IV and the multi-level parking facility, is able to access the Easement, 
and over the Easement, 900 East. [Statement of Facts 5, 6, 7, 8.] 
Although the Woodlands Owners have submitted arguments and questions concerning the 
extent to which Tract B might have been developed without the addition of Tract C, that is not how 
the development of the PUD has occurred. What might have been dreamed of, or even intended by 
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the then owner of Tract B, and what that owner might claim it could have done on Tract B are not 
material issues of fact under the bright line rule. Restatement, §4.11. 
There is therefore no material question that the uses of Tracts B and C have been intertwined. 
It is undisputed that Tower HI would not exist but for its reliance upon the parking facility on Tract 
C. It is also undisputed that Tower IV would not exist but for its inclusion in the PUD. Clearly the 
benefits of the Easement have been extended to Tract C. There is therefore no material question of 
fact that there has been either: 
1. An improper expansion of the dominant estate (considering Tract C as part 
of the integrated and partnership-owned PUD, which, in turn, is considered as a whole for 
development purposes by Salt Lake County, and should be so considered by this court as a 
matter of law), or 
2. An improper connection of the Easement by roadways over and through the 
dominant estate for the benefit of a non-dominant, non-appurtenant parcel through shared use 
and an integrated roadway system. 
The fact that Tower HI is technically situated on Tract B does not change those facts. The 
construction of Tower HI would not have been legally or practically possible, but for the additional 
parking available on Tract C. Tract B has therefore been developed by inclusion of and reliance 
upon a non-dominant parcel. Occupants of and visitors to Tower HI occupy space on Tract C when 
they park their cars there. Furthermore, Tower IV has been constructed on Tract C. The occupants 
and invitees of Tower IV have unrestricted access to the Easement over the common roadways of 
the PUD, by design and requirement of Salt Lake County. 
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5. Application of the Law. Following the bright line rule, the amount of use is not a 
material question of fact. The dominant estate has been indivisibly intertwined with Tract C, and 
the authorized uses have accordingly improperly been expanded to include inseparable unauthorized 
uses. 
The factual situation in DND Neffson, 745 P.2d 206 is directly analogous. See discussion 
of case on page 18-20. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals said: 
The law is clear that an easement appurtenant to a parcel of land, the dominant 
parcel, may not be used to benefit another parcel of land to which the easement is not 
appurtenant even though the two parcels are adjacent and under common ownership. 
The only building plans before this court show clearly that patrons from the non-
dominant parcel will have access to the easement through the dominant parcel, thus 
benefitting from the easement improperly, (citations omitted) Id., at 207. 
In the instant case, just as in the DND Neffson matter, unrestricted access is provided to non-
dominant Tract C according to plan. It actually exists. Given such facts, the Arizona court said: 
. . . however, we are not here concerned with the extent of the burden, i.e. with the 
actual amount of pedestrian and automobile traffic using the easement. An easement 
can be overburdened either by over use or by improper use . . . . 
Having planned the mall to permit unrestricted access to the easement by the non-
dominant parcel, appellant is in no position to contend that that which it planned, a 
plain misuse, will not be used. Accordingly, injunctive relief was not premature. IdL 
See also Penn Bowling, 164 F.2d 64. The facts involved the development of the dominant 
estate and adjacent property, both of which could be accessed by the easement. The court ruled that 
the use of the easement should be enjoined, and said: 
. . . so where it cannot be ascertained whether the easement of a right of way is being 
used solely for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement, or for additional property 
also, an injunction maybe granted against further use of the easement until such time 
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as it may be shown that only the dominant tenement is served by the easement, 
(citation omitted) Id. at 67. 
See also Knotts v. The Summit Park Company. There, the court dealt with an expansion or 
extension to adjacent property, and the development of a road system providing easy access over the 
easement in question to all lot holders, including lot holders outside of the dominant estate. 
Although the court had found that an abandonment had occurred, it concluded that, had not that 
abandonment occurred, the easement would be extinguished by that misuse. It said: 
It is not a satisfactory answer to say that the use of this right of way must be 
only for the benefit of the lots within the dominant estate. A condition has been 
created by the act of appellee which makes it impossible, as a practical proposition, 
for appellant to confine the use to such lots, (citation omitted) Id, at 283. 
6. The Remedy. The remedy is clear. See Law of Easements and Licenses, §10:26. 
If the easement holder misuses the servitude, the servient estate owner may generally 
obtain an injunction restraining the overburden. However, an easement holder may 
misuse an easement in such a way that a court cannot separate the wrongful activity 
from appropriate usage for purposes of issuing an injunction. In such unusual cases, 
a court may declare the easement terminated in order to eliminate the overburden 
on the servient estate. 
An easement may also be lost by misuse when the owner of the dominant estate 
acquires adjacent property not entitled to enjoyment of the easement and constructs 
a building occupying both parcels. If use of the easement related to the portion of the 
building on the non-dominant property cannot be separated from use related to the 
part of the structure on the dominant estate, the easement may be terminated. 
However, a court may choose instead to grant in injunction against any use of the 
easement pending alteration of the building to eliminate the overburden. [Citing, in 
a footnote, Perm Bowling, supra, at 67 and DND Neffson, supra, at 207.] 
Although the concept that an easement may be extinguished by misuse has been 
recognized by many courts and commentators, it has rarely been employed to 
terminate a servitude. Nonetheless, the doctrine is founded on sound equitable 
principles and should not be ignored or rejected merely because cases calling for its 
application arise infrequently, (emphasis added, footnotes omitted.) Bruce, §10:26. 
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On the basis of the foregoing, if the bright line rule is applicable to Utah, there is no material 
question of fact. The trial court not only erred in granting summary judgment to the Woodlands 
Owners, but erred in refusing to grant summary judgment to Lutheran. 
CONCLUSION 
An Easement across servient Tract A, now owned by Lutheran, was created by Declaration 
in 1983 for the benefit of dominant Tract B. The owners of Tract B did not, at that time, own or 
even contemplate owning the adjacent property to the north. The limited scope of the Easement over 
Tract A is clearly set forth in the Declaration. Tract B was developed as a PUD, improved with two 
office towers, two retail strip mall buildings, a parking facility and a roadway system for circulation. 
It was then sold to the Woodlands Owners in 1993. 
The Woodlands Owners expanded the Woodland Business Park PUD to include Tract C, and 
on that basis, constructed two more high-rise buildings and one multi-level parking structure, all of 
which were connected by the integrated roadway system. Tract C is not part of the dominant estate 
for purposes of the Easement. The roadway system provides access, to all users, authorized and 
unauthorized, to and over the Easement across Tract A. In fact, its very integration, including access 
from Tract C to 900 East through the interconnected roadways on the PUD, is required by Salt Lake 
County. The development of Tract B and Tract C has been so indivisibly intertwined that the 
authorized uses of the Easement cannot be separated from the unauthorized uses. 
If the law of Utah would permit an examination of the reasonableness of the use which has 
resulted, there are numerous material questions of fact. If the law would permit an examination of 
the intent of the parties to determine whether the expansion was contemplated, there are material 
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questions of fact. If the actual change in the burden, compared to that which would be reasonably 
anticipated in respect to "normal" development of Tract B, is to be considered, material questions 
of fact exist. The ruling of the trial court, in which it granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Woodlands Owners, should be reversed. At the least, the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for trial. 
If the law of Utah is the bright line rule, then the issues are narrowed and there is no material 
question of fact. The ruling of the trial court should be reversed with instructions to award judgment 
to Lutheran. The expansion of the dominant estate to inextricably envelope Tract C, or the 
connection of the Easement to and for the use of a non-dominant parcel (Tract C) is a misuse, and 
an improper overburdening of the servient estate, as a matter of law. There is no reason to examine 
the intent of the creators. The amount of such use, under those circumstances, is immaterial. 
Because the authorized and unauthorized uses are so indivisibly intertwined, Lutheran has no 
adequate remedy at law. Use of the Easement across Tract A should therefore be enjoined 
indefinitely, or extinguished, entirely. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / d a y of March, 2003. 
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Exhibit A Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions and Amendment to 
Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions 
Exhibit B Highlighted copy of Salt Lake County plat map 
Exhibit C Affidavit of John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., with exhibits 
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<7> DECLARATION OF EASEMENTS, 
C\ COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS 
THIS DECLARATION ( t h e " D e c l a r a t i o n " ) l a . made a n d 
entered into thio g 1 day of Qck^e/z. ; 1983, by and 
between WOODLAND IHVE5TMENT CO., a Utah l imited partnerohip. 
^'Woodland"), and THE WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, a j o i n t venture 
organized pursuant to the Utah Uniform Partnership Act 
("Asaociatca"). 
RECITALS 
A. Woodland owno a tract of real property ("Tract. A") 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, tno legal dcocription 
of which ia net forth on Exhibit "A."' 
B. Asoociateo, contemporaneously with tha execution 
of thio Declaration, io acquiring a tract of real property 
("Tract B") located in Salt Lake County; Stato of Utah, tha legal 
description of which io oet forth on Exhibit "B." 
C. Tho partioo deoiro to create certain croso 
eaoenento and righto between and inpooa certain covenanto and
 CT 
restriction on Tracta A and B. ^ 
THEREFORE, for TEN DOLLARS'($10.00) and other good and tn 
voluablo consideration, tho receipt and oufficioncy of which are ?? 





1. Definitions. hn used in this Declarationi 
(a) "Party" meana each person executing this 
instrument and its hcira, assigns and successors in interest with 
respect to Tract A or Tract B, as the case may be, as the same 
may be shown by the records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
QB of the date of the exercise of powers granted hereunder or the 
performance of or failure of performance by such Parties of the 
obligations created by this Declaration. Without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, the term Party refers to the persona 
who fit trie following classifications: 
.'
i 
(i) The person or persons holding fee title 
to all or any portion of Tract A or Tract Bj and 
(ii) The leasee or lessees under a ground 
lease of all or a portion of any Tract for a fixed minimum term 
of thirty (30) years, or longer, in which event the fee owner of 
the real property covered by such lease will not be"deemed to be 
a Party as to such Tract or portion of such Tract for the 
purposes of this Declaration during the duration of such ground 
lease. 
(b) "Parties" means every person who is a Party, 
taken in the aggregate. 
2. Covenants and Restrictions with Respect to Tract 
(a) No partv shall attempt to obtain or consent 
to any change or variance in zoning of Tract B if such change 
would Jeopardize the right of Woodland, its successors and 
assigns, to retain and maintain any sign described in Section 3 
of this Declaration. 
(b) The official name "of any building complex 
located on Tract B will contain the -word "Woodland" or 
."Woodlands" unless tho use of such word is not permitted by 
applicable laws, reguJationu or ordinances. The owner of Tract B 
shall havo the right to relieve Tract B of the obligation imposed 
by this Section 2(b) by paying to the owner of Tract A, in a lump _, 
cuia, the amount of $100,000 for tho express and solo purpose of fo 
obtaining such ralief. Cn 
(c)• No part of Tract*B-shall, for a period of S^ 
twanty-fiva (25) yearo following tho-de-to of this Declaration, be 
used so a-Thoator-Ractauranti .provided,, that.this*restriction ' £ 
shall be void if no Theater-Restaurant io operated on Tract A for 
a continuous period of sixty (60) months. For purposes of this 
Section 2(c), the term "Theater-Restaurant" ohail mean a public 
or private dining facility, operated for profit, having 20 or 
more tables, where live vocal, theatrical or comedy entertainment 
is regularly provided. 
(d) If construction of a Health Club on Tract A 
is commenced before the latter of one (1) year from the date of 
this Declaration or nine (9) months after the commencement of 
construction of the fi^rt building on Tract B, then for as long 
as such Health Club ie completed within a reasonable time and 
continuously available to the Parties with respect to Tract B and 
all tenants of such Parties and all of the personnel of such 
tenants, at prices competitive with or less than those being 
charged by Health Clubs open to the general public, no Health 
Club will be operated on Tract B or directly or indirectly by 
Associates (but no'; its successors) within a radius of 5/8's of a 
mile of Tract A. For" purposes of this Section 2(d), the term 
"Health Club" shall mean a public or private facility containing 
a jogging facility, exercise and weight room, a sauna, swimming 
pool, tennis or racquetball court, a Jacuzzi or similar 
significant exercise iacility. 
3. Si%ng on Tract B. Subject to the limitations set 
forth below, Associates grants to Woodland the right to erect and 
operate on Tract B, at any time and from time to timo, one 
free-standing doublc-oidcd sign (the "Woodland Sign11), which may 
be a "pylon" sign. The design and operation of the Woodland Sign 
shall comply with the following conditionsi 
(n) Any Woodland Sign may be electrically-lighted 
and may display lighted, electronically activated messages, Tho 
dimensions, height and style of any woodland Sign shall bo 
designated by Woodland but shall be subject to tho approval of a 
licensed building architect. Such architect shall be chosen by 
the Party owning Tract R from a list of three licensedxbuilding 
architects selected by Woodland, Tho face or facea of any 
Woodland Sign shall bo located within a square or rectangle, and 
said square or rectangle shall not exceed 275. square feet per 
side. o. 
(b) Any Woodland Sign shall be erected on* a • Cn 
parcel of land located in tho Southwest corner of Tract B and ^2. 
described on Exhibit "C" (tho "Woodland Sign Location"). To tho' Jo 
extent feaaible the Woodland Sign ohall bo located on the 
southern ten (10) feet of the Woodland Sign Location. The 
Woodland Sign nay be altered or replaced from time to time as 
long aa the alteration or replacement complies with tha 
limitation*! Get forth in this Section 3. 
(c) The Woodland Sign nay not bo iiaed to 
advertise or refer in any way to an office or officco for rent, 
(d) The design and operation of any Woodland Sign 
will comply with all applicable laws, ordinances and regulations, 
(e) Woodland, at its cost and expense, shall 
maintain any Woodland Sign in good and safe operating condition. 
If Woodland fails to maintain any Woodland Sign, then, on one 
hundred eighty (180) days' written notice to .Woodland, Associates 
may either cause such maintenance to be performed or have the 
sign removed and shall have a lien on Tract A for the amount 
expended in maintaining (but not removing) any Woodland Signj 
plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (122) per annua frca 
the date of such expenditure. 
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision contained 
in this Section 3, the right of Woodland and Its successoro and' 
assigns to erect any Woodland Sign and to.possess tho Woodland 
Sign Location shall be extinguished if such sign is not erected, 
within five (5) years of the date hereof or if such sign* once 
erected, io abandoned for a continuous period of ono (1) year 
thereafter, 
(g) Woodland and each person constituting a Party 
with respect to Tract A shall -indemnify, defend and rtold. 
Associates and each person constituting a Party with respect toi 
Tract B harmless from and against any and all liabilities, 
losses, actions, proceedings, judgments, controversies, claims,. 
costs or expenses (including attorneys' fees) arising out of the 
design, use or operation of any Woodland Sign. 
(h) No right granted to Woodland by this Section 
3 shall limit or restrict in any way tho right of Associates to 
erect and operate (or permit to bo erected and operated) signs on 
Tract B. 
(i) Associates may place on Tract A a sign advertising 
the office project to be located on Tract B. Such sign nay 
remain until April 30, 1984. 
A, Grant of Easement. 
(a) Woodland granto to Associates a nonexclusive 
easement appurtenant to and serosa Tract A for the purpose of 
allowing vehicular access between the public streets ana any and 
all parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract Bi .. 
provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be limited to 
use for such purposes and to such extent uo may be custocary for 
use of Tract B for commercial purposes (includingi but not 
limited to, reasonable and customary deliveries)* -The easement 
granted by thia subsection (a) ohall be limited to the roadway ; 
described on Exhibit "D" (tho "Associates Roadway")4 At any time 
before December 31, 1983, by giving written notice to Associates! 
Woodland may relocate the Associates Roadway up to twenty-five ' 
(25) feet to the north or south of the centerline of the 
Associates Roadway as described on Exhibit "D." Thereafter, 
Woodland shall not move or relocate the Associates Roadway. In 
addition to the foregoing, Associates shall have the right to 
elevate or sink the western twenty (20) feet of the Associates 
Roadway in order to align the sane with the upper ahd/or lower 
decks of a parking ramp. On or before November 30i 1984 
Woodland agrees to construct a paved roadway twenty-five (25) 
feet wide on the Associates Roadway in accordance.with good 
construction practices• 
(b) Associates grants to Woodland a nonexclusive 
easement appurtenant to and across Tract B for tho puroose of • 
allo-wlnc vehicular access between the public streets and any and 
all parking areas situated on Tract A» ' The casement granted by' 
thia subsection (b) shall be limited to tho roadway described on 
Exhibit "E" (tho "Woodland Roadway"). . In addition Associates • 
shall provide a tventy-five (25) root two-way access lane;from 
the Woodland Roadway to tho Associates Roadway, in such location 
as Associates may designate (tho "Connecting Roadway"). • At any-
time before Oeccmbcr 311 1983, by giving written notico-. to . 
Woodland, Associates may relocate the Woodland Roadway up to e» 
twenty-five (25) foec to the north or south of the centerline o£ § 
the Woodlar.d Roadway as described on Exhibit hE k" Thereafter in 
Asoociates ohall not movo or relocate the Woodland Roadwayi. On ^ 
or before June 30, 1985 Associates agrees to contruct a paved- £j 
roadway twenty-five (25) feet wide on the Woodland.Roadway and 
the Connecting Roadway in accordance with good construction 
practices. The foregoing notwithstanding the easementa granted 
over the Woodland Roadway and the Connecting Roadway ohall be 
subject to the following conditional 
l 
(i) The easement for the Connecting Roadway 
is limited to seven (7) feet in heighti 
(ii) The easementa for the Woodland Roadway 
and the Connecting Roadway are Halted to uae for auch purposes 
and to such extent ao may be customary for use of Tract A for 
commercial purpooco (including, but not limited to, reasonable 
and customary delivtriea consistent with the foregoing height 
restriction) and to erect and maintain any Woodland Signj 
(iii) A parking ramp or any similar 
structure may be constructed on Tract B except over the Woodland 
Roadway, and Associates may route all traffic using the 
Connecting Roadway through such structuro on the upper and/or the 
lower deck of any ouch structurej and 
(iv) The location of the Connecting Roadway 
may be altered, relocated or changed in any manner and at any 
ciror and from time to titno withouc the prior written consent of 
Woodland upon aiuty (60) dayo' prior written'notica.to Woodland. 
(c) The Parties agree to keep and maintain at its 
sole cost and expense the roadways located on its Tract in good 
condition* If a Party faila to so keep and maintain the roadway' 
for which it is Responsible, or to construct the same, the other 
Party may on thirty (30) days written notice to perform such, 
maintenance and/or construction and tha performing party shall 
have a lien on tha Tract owned by tho defaulting Party-for the:, 
amount expended piuo interest at the rato of twelve percent (12Z) 
per annum from the date of ouch expenditure. 
(d) Tho oaboconto granted pursuant to' this 
Section 4 shall benefit each of tho Parties and thoir roapcctlvo 
tenants, concessionaires, customers! invitees and guestsf and tha 
concessionaires, invitees, customoro and guesta of any-tenant, or 
subtenant of th«e respective Parties. * '" g 
.^ 
5« "Duration; This Declaration and esch easement. y* 
covenant, restriction and undertaking of .this Declaration shall o 
be for a term of nincty-nina (99) years unless sooner terminated 
purouant to Section 2. 
6. Modification, Thio Decloration and any easement, 
covenant, restriction or undertaking contained herein may be 
terminated, extended, modified or amended as to the whole of the 
Tracts of any portion of them, with the unanimous"-concent, of the' 
Tarties. 
7. Nor, a Public Dedication. Nothing '/contained in 
thio Declaration will be deemed to bo a gift or a;dedication of 
any portion of cither Tract to the general public" or for the 
general public or for ony public purpose whatsoever, it being the 
intent of the Partieo that chio Declaration be otrictly limited 
to and for tho purpose expressed herein, 
8. :• Mutuality; Deneflto and Burdens Run with Land. 
(a) Each and all of tho easements, covenants, 
restrictions, rights and provisions granted or created horein are 
appurtcnancea to the Tracts and none of the easements, covenants, 
restrictions, righto and provisions may be transferred, assigned, 
or encumbered except ao an appurtenance to such Tracts. For the 
purpooeo of the easements, covenantor restrictions, rights and 
provlaiono created by this Declaration, the Tract benefited will 
constituto tho dominant estate, and the Tract burdened by such 
basements, covenants, restrictions, righto and provioiono-will 
constitute tho servient.estate. 
(b) Each-'and all of tho easements, covenants,, 
rcutrictionc, conditions, rights and provioiono contained in this 
Declaration (whether affirmative or negative in nature) are made• 
for the direct:, mutual and reciprocal benefit of each Tractj will 
create mutual couitable servitudes upon each Tract running with, 
the landi will bind and inure to the benefit of every person 
having any fee, leasehold,' or other intoreot in any portion:of 
the Tracts at any timo or from timo to timo to tho oxtont that 
ouch portion io affoctcd or bound by tha oaoemont,..covonant,'v 
restriction, right or.provision in queotlonf.or that tho.case-
ment, covenant, restriction, riftht or provision * io . to be .V ,-. 
performed on ouch portioni and will bind and inura to fcha benefit 
of the Partieo.and their respective heira,* ouccooooro and assigns 
ao to their respective Tracts,' * -..-...« 
9. Miscellaneous Provisions. 
(a) The Parties do not by th i s Declaration, in 
any way or for any purpose, become partners or Joint venturers of 
each other in the conduct of the ir respective businesses or 
otherwise. 
(b) Each Party sha l l be excused for the period of 
any delay in the performance of any obligations .hereunder when 
prevented from timely performing by a cause or^causes beyond such 
Party's control , including labor disputes, c i v i l ."commotion, war, 
governmental regulat ions , moratorium or controls , f i r o or other 
casus'.ty, i n a b i l i t y to obtain.any material or s e r v i c e s , or acta 
of God. 
(c) Failure of a Party to insist^upon the s tr ic t" 
performance of any provision or to exercise any option hereunder 
s h a l l no t .be construed as a waiver for future purposes with 
respect to anv Much provision or opt ion . - ' Mo provioion of th i s 
Declaration sna i l be deemed to have been waived unless such 
waiver io in wri t ing and.signed by. tho\Party a l l e g e d to have 
waived i t a r ighta . 
.••(d) If, any provision of this Declaration or tho 
appl icat ion thereof to any person-or circumstance shall* to* any 
extent be i n v a l i d , .the remainder. of th i s Declaration or the 
-app l i ca t ion of such provision to persons or- circumstances other 
than those aa to which i t io held inva l id ' sha l l , not be. affected*, 
thereby and each provision of th is Declaration s h a l l be val id, and 
enforced to the f u l l e s t extont permitted by law. . 
(e) Except as otherwise provided}*.air provisions 
herein sha l l be binding upon and shal l inure- to.,the benefit of , 
the Part ieo , the ir legal representat ivesp heirsk\.successors and\ 
a s s i g n s , 
(f) Each porson\dx6cfiting"chl6:'Deciafafc^^ 
entity represents and warrants', that* he is duly;.authorized• to•-, •< 
executo and deliver thb came on behalf.of.tho entity .for.which'he 
is signing (whothcr it bo a corporation,, genoral or •  limited' 
partnership or otherwise), and that this Declaration-is'binding 
upon such entity in accordance with!-, it a terms* 
(g) This Declaration shal l be construed in 
accordance with the laws of tho Stato of Utah. 
(h) Al l exhibito referred to in thio Declaration. 
are hereby incorporated by reference, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tho part ies hereto have executed 
t h i s Declaration on the* day and year f i r s t oeC forth above;...'. 
"WOODLAND"! 
WOODLAKD INVESTMENT C0%l a Utah 
linited partnership 
By ^ L s w , 
"ASSOCIATES11; 
THE UOODLAttDS ASSOCIATES/ a * 
Joint venture organised under 
the Utah.Uniform Partnership * 
Act: by ibo,two«Venturerst:i< , 
"v . ' : ' / ' * . >\.> ^ ; V . 
foHP-WOODLAJtoS," LTD.* 'A Utatr ' 
l imitod partnership, by , i t s 
oole general partner KHC 
PROPERTIES* INC.ai.Ucah-
corporation 
SLC-i LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a 
Wisconsin l imited partnershipj 
by i t s sola general partner 
JOHNSON WAX DEVELOPMENT* 
CORPORATION, a W i s c o n s i n . .: 
c o r p o r a t i o n . -*. .. •• 'r 
STATE OF 
.4&L SOT; 
COUNTY OF <jfi//%/{?A ) 
On the^^^drt^ of //fiAJ/i/A J » I983i- personal 
before me ^rttfss// SK /{fa7fa<i'« ^ : w h o o e i n 8 by 
n, did 8 ay "thai: he io 3,^,4j)S Liam//A ) ' of WOODI appeared duly owor  mo 
oaf pi pa^tJherot\^)i 
:My , 
p/i / > > ' ' 6 l ly 
S.*V/"S^K rfJm/rftM/t^ •' who being by i 
•Kaf  la rt/^si/ yi/kify  * ' f LAND 
Utah l imited' partnership, and said 
duly acknowledged to mo that the 
oing instrument wao signed on behalf of 
i Cpiminoibn ftspireat. 
*'.*e Ac K 












vcnturo organised: pursuant toVtho.Utoh.Uniforti Partnership-Ac 
and said- \rx#*A/{ /l'\^d/aA{%^\ XM^ •acknowledged to 
that tho. QicraCuccTd u i th in anayiorogoing-inotrurant ttaa oighod 
appeatad Hofora ma^ 
duly svorn \ did- aay C ho i s .. ^^W*<,J** ;-*<>* \ o r MHC.i> 
PROPERTIES, ItlCira«Utaft corporation» which i s tho general.'*':'. 
partner of MH?-Woodlandsrttd»
 9- a Utah limited pa*tnoronip> tohiefc 
io ono 'o f thd-aombor / f Tha • ttcodlsnds Aosociatooj . o-Joiht.**7v.-
— . —
 J
"i  Stho. to . if ti Part  fci:-
' ' ' " **"" • - * - « - - - i • . ^ ^ Q 0 Q 
ji  on 
behalf of raid corporation in its capacity as the sole general 
partner of MHP-Woodlands, Ltd.* on behalf of said'partnership' in* 
its captraity ao one of the venturers of The Woodlands Associatesj. 
on...behalf of said partnership, by authority of. its bylaws or a 
resolution^ f\ita board of directors 
•Ky ^njaiflaliqExpireoi 
STATE. OP'' //rt//L 
Public. 
Reoiding at* 
COUNTY 0*<J?<ft/6/c >>: ) \ 
On fa*///£$ay ot./tfsy/7/4 $ 19631" persona l ly appeared1 
before me. , 7/fftfsvi /fa.^+ty/tT > ".who being by CQ* duly a^orn* did 
say that h V T o ^ ^ ^ x y y ^ > • ' of JOHNSON WAX. DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION» a wioconoln corporation*. Whichvia * the general •; 
partner of SLC-1 Limited Partnership ( a-. Wisconsin • limited'*:* 
partnership, which lo one of tho kenboro' of The Woodlandov.-
xuro • orgnnized/pursuanf to qntiyUtah . 
,. and- said u g / ^ f t f /Atf&SSZ-i • ^ 7 
: the; orcecuted within, and. forogoing . 
Uniform Partnerohip Act». __^  
acknowledged to mo that   , . i g' 
instrument was oigned on behalf of said, corporation ..in:. ito:*; 
capacity ao tho oolo general;, partner of SLC-lr\Liraitod.,; ',;.-.".-
Partnorohip, on bohalf o? said partnership in. i t o capacity.a£ *ono 
of tho venturers of The Woodlands Aeoociatoo$:">on bohalf. of said;-; 
partno.rohipi by authority of i to . bylawo or a. resolut ion-of ito-*': 
:bt>^rci.gf d irectorst - - S? ; •'•'•* >^/; •'' 
-My Cocmadion Expires* &#»1 
folding,'at'* 
'Alt 
sec ***• prut j i *7 V 5|
 g |r g 
1
 * » a , TBOM „ 
. . ^  -xa ' SSSg * 
AMENDMENT TO JJ^ 2 « * *5 * * 
3 9 0 7 7 3 1 DECLARATION OP SASEMEOTS 
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS 
THIS AMENDMENT I the "Amendment") i* aad* thie / ^ day 
o f
 Jf &*** - -r 1984, between WOODLANX} INVESTMENT CO», a Utah 
linited partnership (Woodland-) and TK5 1IOODIAH&S ASSOCIATES, a 
joint venture organized pursuant, to the Vtah Uniform Partnership 
Act ('»Associates*)* 
KfiCXTALSl 
A- on October 27# 1983 the parties executed a certain 
Declaration of Eaaemanta, covenants and Restrictions wMcfo was 
recorded October 27# 1983, in Book 5502, at Page 15S9 vith the 
County Baoorder of Salt &afca County, State of Utah (the "Original 
Declaration"). 
B» The Original Declaration waa amended on 
February 20, 1994/ but tuch amandoant hat not been recorded, 
C. Cartain of the Reeitala aafe forth in the Original 
Declaration wera incorrect* g 
tfoW# THEREFORE, for ten dollars ($10,00) and other good i* 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and lufficianoy of vhich §? 
are hereby acknowledged, tho p&rtiaa agtaa aa followt1 
I, Awndmant to Recital A, Recital ^ or the Original 
Declaration i« amended to ra^d a* followii 
A* WooSlairi cwne a-tract of real 
property (•Tract; A*) located ,.in Salt LaXe 
County* State of Utah
 r the legal description 
of whldb is set forth ox; Exhibit "«•* 
?., Amendment to Recital S> Recital B of the Original 
Declaration is anendad to read an fallows$ 
B> Associates owns a tract"of real 
property {"Trret &M) located-in salt Lake 
county
 f state of UtaTw the legal description" 
of which is Aat forth on Exhibit «h<m 
3* Ratification:, in all other xeopecta ttte original 
Declaration, as previously; amended i# rat iflad and affirmed, 
XV WtTNZSS WH5R20F* the parties hereto have executed 
this Aaendaent ©a the data',;first eat forth above. 
wooBLwro INVESTMENT co*, 
a Utah United partnerehip 
*HB WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, a ^ 
joint venture organised under £* 
the Utah Uniform Partnership |fl 
Act by ita two Venturers i <jj 
MHP-^OODLANOS, LTD*, a Utah S ' 
lioitod partnership, by its N> 
dole general partner MHC K 
MttPBRTXES, INC, a Utah SJ 
corporation 
^ \UJJ ^-^-^ 
8LC-1 UWITED PARTNERSHIP, a 
Wieconain Uni ted p«kn«rehtp* 
by i t s to ld general partner . 
JOmUSOff WAX DEVELOPMENT 
COHPORATIOH, a K i a c o n a l n 
corporation 
Ita 
STATE CP UTAH 
COUHT* OP SALT LAKE 
)&A 
) 
on the / f f ^ d a y of 
appeared before »e EUCESZ " 
as. 
O/AtP i 19S4, paraonaily 
VtyBODLAtfD, who toeing by aa J*uly 
sworn, did eay that %a ia the General partner of WQODLAJU* 
INVESTMENT CO*, a Utah Halted partnership, and eald SUCStfE N„ 
WOODLAND duly acknowledged to ma that the executed within and 
foregoing Instrument waa aigned on behalf of aaid partnerehip. 
STATS Of UTAH 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) aa. 
on the / f t ^ d a y of ( /'A&el' 
before pa GARY L. HACKAN, who bei 
, 1984/ perionally 
appeared TST   SKAK, ng by ae duly aworn, 
did aay that ha Is the President of MHC PROPERTIES, IKC, a Utah 
corporation, vhicft la the general partner af MHP-WOODLAtfDS, LTD*, 
a Utah United partnerahip, which ia one of tha aeabera of THE 
WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, a joint «^r. -\*re organised purmant to the 
Utah Uniform partnenhip Act, und aaid CAAY L« HAOtAtt daly ac-
knowledged to «• that tha.'aKrtuted within and foregoing 
instrument waa eignad on behalf of aaid corporation in iti 
capacity aa the aole general partner Of HKP-W00DLAtfD8 LTO«, on 
fcehalt of eeid partnenhip in ite capacity aa one of the ven-
tured et ThS WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, on b*h*lf Of aaid 
x 
-3-
partnership, &y authority of it* oyiawa or a resolution oz ita 
board of director*. 
HOTARY 
Residing At* Salt Lalie City, Utah 
STA^S^JTW 
cousjr* o* SAXIT LAKE 
,
 v Cn tho ^ > * y ot-J&qt^ - I 9 8<' Personally ap-
peared before ^^ggfefrgrf'' r / ^ j ^ / g y w£oJ>eing by ae 
duly aworn, did say'that ha in the J/fo. j&Rstfb>,tfr. _ of 
JOHNSOH WAX DSVEMPHEOT COftPCWATIOK/' H Wiaconci in corpox at ion, 
whidh ia the general partner of SLOl LIMITED PARTMEBSKIP, a 
viaoonsin limited partnership, Which ia one of the aanbera of THE 
WOODLMDS ASSOCIATES, a joint venture organised purrtfgpt *0 th* 
tffcah Unifora Partnarehip Aofc# and aaid yrfffifav/s * JM^/>^ 
__^__f^ _-- duly acknowledged to me"that the executed within "and foregoing inefcriment wau eigned on bahalf of aaid corporation in 
lta capacity aa the aoia general partner of SLOl LIMITED 
PARTNERS HI P> on behal* of aaid partnership in ita capacity aa one 
Of tha Vanturera of TMB HOOOLfttfDS ASSOCIATES, on behalf of aaid 
partnership, by authority of ita bylaws or a resolution o£ ita 
board of alrectoro. 
,, < \x . , ^ J M / 
t^ARY PUBLIC My. coaunicidoft-^xpirea; Residing ati Bait LaVa City. Utah 
A V 




BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block" 5, Ten Acre 
Har. tfAM, Big Field Survey; and running thence South O«09'59M 
V*-- 572,84 feet to the Southeast corner of said Lot Bj thence 
South 0*09lS9,f Uest 19.83 feet to the South ljLne;o£ Lot 14At 
CLEARVIEW ACS£S SUBDIVISION thence South B9"55' V**c 106.51 feet 
to the Southeast comer of Lot ISA? thence North 8S*SO"40" West 
100,01 feet to the Southeast: corner of Lot 1$A* thence North 
89*52'30M Weec 100.00 feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 17A; 
thence tforth 89*59'27M Weft 100,00 feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 18A| thence North a a ^ l O " Veat 10Q*03 feat to the 
Southeast corner of Lot 19A* thence North 89*01' West 100*01 feet 
to the Southeast comer of Lot 2GAj thence North B7#39"20u West 
160,11 feet to the Southwest corner of aaid Lot 20Aj CLEABV1EW 
ACRES SUBDIVISION thence North C I V 13" Ee$t 6.78 feet to the 
So^thveat comer of said Lot 8j Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A11! 
thence North C I V I T ' East 573.07 feet-to the Northeast corner of 
said Lot 8j thence South 89*58'24" East 89,30 feetj thence along 
the arc of a 622.03 foot radius curve to the right 715,24 feet to 
the point of BEGINNING, aaid arc being subtended by a chord of 






peal Property Owned by Vtoodland investment-company 
The following real property located in Salt Lake County, 
Utah: 
TKACT I 
Commencing 145.67 feat Sovth from the Northeast corner of 
Lot 12/ fclocX 5, Ten Acre Plat A, Big Field Survey* thence 
South 237.13 feet? 1**st 379*5 feet; North 0*06f10* East 383 
feet? East 229.5 fecfej South 145.67 feet: East 150 feet to 
BEGINNING. 2.B2 acres. 
TRACT II 
Commencing North 0*34* Bast 168.2 feet from th* Southeast 
comer Qf Lot 12, Biocic 5, Ten Acre £lat A, Big Field Survey; 
thence North 0*04f East 23-3 feet; Weet 23 rods South 0*04f 
West 23.2 fegtr East 23 rode to B£CINNING. 0.2 acres, ' 
TRACT III 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 11« Block 5, Ten 
Acre Plat wAn9 Big field Survey; thence Weat 766.09 feet; , 
North 327,21 feet; Bast 766.09 feet? South 327.21 feet to jj» 
BEGINNING. ..;/' f^  
tfhe foregoing notwithstanding 7ract$;Kr shall, e£j 
benefited by t h e Woodland Easement only so long as its u s f i \ 
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Diane H. Banks (A4966) 
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; JDJ Properties, Inc.; and 
The Woodlands Business Park Association 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT 
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, 




WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, BEDFORD 
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a 
Maryland corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, THE 
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, WASATCH PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN A. DAHLSTROM, JR. 
Civil No. 960908063 PR 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I am Executive Vice President, General Counsel of Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc., which is under contract to manage the Woodlands Business Park, located at 
approximately 4000 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Office Tower 1 at the Woodlands Business Park is eight (8) stories in height and 
is owned by JDJ Properties, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
4. Office Tower 2 at the Woodlands Business Park is six (6) stories in height and is 
owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, a Utah limited liability company. 
5. Office Tower 3 at the Woodlands Business Park is four (4) stories in height and is 
owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC. 
6. Office Tower 4 at the Woodlands Business Park is not owned by any of the 
Defendants named in this lawsuit. 
7. There are also two retail buildings at the Woodlands Business Park; one is owned 
by JDJ Properties, Inc., the other is owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC. 
8. The tenants and customers of the retail space and Office Towers I, II and III park 
in two parking structures. One parking structure with 2 levels, situated immediately east of the 
three office towers, is owned by the Woodlands Business Park Association, a Utah non-profit 
corporation. The second parking structure with 3 levels is situated northeast of Office Tower III, 
abutting the roadway within the Woodlands Business Park. Access to the parking 
228806-1 2 
* l " l 
structure which is situated northeast of Office lower III is via 700 East, 3900 South or the right-
of-way from 900 East along the north boundary of the Lutheran High School property. 
9. An accurate photograph of the right-of-way on the Lutheran High School 
Property leading to the parking structure situated to the ea^t of Office Towers 1, II and ITT is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A1". 
10. An accurate photograph of the parking structure situated to the northeast of Office 
Tower 111 is attached as Exhibit UB'\ 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this of September, 2001. 
NOTARY m m j e 
REBECCA F. HICKS 
8661 South 1700 E«fc 
Sandy, t/T 84083 
My Commission ExptaM 
January 10,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before ntfonihis f$' day of September 2001 
22K806-1 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the .QpV- day of September, 2001,1 hereby certify that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. DALHSTROM, JR., ESQ. by depositing 
said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Sue J. Chon 
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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Exhibit D 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Diane H. Banks (A4966) 
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands ETI Holdings, LLC; Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC; 
JDJ Properties, Inc.; and The Woodlands Business Park Association 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT 
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, 




WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
WOODLANDS IV HOLDINGS, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; BEDFORD 
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a 
Maryland corporation; JDJ PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation; THE 
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation; WASATCH PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960908063 PR 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Woodlands HI Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., and The Woodlands 
Business Park Association, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment") on or about September 25, 2001. Plaintiff thereafter filed its 
Supplemental Complaint on or about February 8, 2002, joining Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, as 
a defendant. On or about March 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, joined in the motion papers in support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
motions were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the court for decision, accompanied by 
a request for oral argument. Both motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Sandra N. 
Peuler on April 22, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. The moving Defendants were represented by P. Bruce 
Badger and Matthew L. Anderson of Fabian & Clendenin. Plaintiff was represented by Stephen 
F. Hutchinson of Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson. Defendant Bedford Property Investors, 
Inc., was represented by Ronald G. Russell of Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
The court heard argument of counsel and having fully considered the parties' respective 
moving papers, including affidavits supporting and opposing the motions, and being otherwise 
fully advised, now enters its order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in 
the Minute Entry dated April 26, 2002 (attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference) and as set forth in Defendants' memoranda filed in support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied for the reasons set forth in the 
Minute Entry (Exhibit "A" hereto) and as set forth in Defendants' memorandum opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. This action involves a non-exclusive easement (the "Easement") appurtenant to 
and across a parcel of property located in Salt Lake County which is currently owned by the Salt 
Lake Lutheran High School. The Easement runs west from 900 East at approximately 4000 
South and was granted for the purpose of providing vehicular access to a portion of what is now 
the Woodlands Business Park located on 700 East. The Easement was created by a Declaration 
of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1983 Declaration"), which was recorded in the 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on October 27, 1983, as Entry 3862259, Book 5502, 
Page 1559. The legal descriptions that were attached as exhibits to the 1983 Declaration were 
reversed, so an Amendment to Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1984 
Declaration") was recorded on June 20, 1984, as Entry 3957731, Book 5566, Page 2146, to 
correctly set forth the legal descriptions of the affected parcels. The Easement is referred to in 
the 1983 Declaration as the u Associates Roadway". The servient estate with respect to the 
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract A in the 1983 Declaration, and is 
more particularly described in Exhibit "B" hereto. The dominant estate with respect to the 
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract B in the 1983 Declaration, and is 
more particularly described in Exhibit "C" hereto. 
4. Since the grant of the Easement, the Woodlands Business Park has expanded to 
property north of the dominant estate that the parties to this action have referred to variously as 
Tract C, or the "Northern Parcel" or "Expansion Property", which is more particularly described 
in Exhibit "D" hereto. Tract C contains both a high-rise office building ("Tower IV") owned by 
Woodlands IV Holdings LLC, and a multi-level parking facility. 
5. The Easement, which is for the benefit of the dominant estate, has not been 
overburdened by the use of the Easement by the owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires 
of Tract B and their customers, invitees and guests, including their use of the Easement to access 
parking on Tract C. 
6. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract B and their 
customers, invitees and guests, may continue to use the Easement to access parking on Tract C. 
7. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract C and their 
customers, invitees and guests, may not use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV 
Holdings, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the Easement by the Tower IV 
tenants, subtenants and concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests, including 
notifying them, restricting access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may be 
appropriate. 
8. This Order is an adjudication of all of the claims in this action notwithstanding 
that Wasatch Properties Management, Inc., was joined as a defendant and has never appeared. 
Accordingly, the court expressly determines that there is no just reason to delay entry of final 
judgment and expressly directs entry of this Order as Final Judgment. 
9. Any person may record a certified copy of this Order in the official records 
of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The recording of this Order shall serve 
to immediately release the Lis Pendens recorded in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on November 21,1996, as Entry 6511599, Book 7540, Page 10, which referenced 
the real property described in Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" hereto. 
DATED this _f\ day of S ^ ^ ^ t u ^ v _ , 2002. 
Approved as to form: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Stephen F. Hutchinson 
Sue J. Chon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the l^' day of August, 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order Granting Defendants5 Motion For Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment by hand delivering said 
document as follows: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Sue J. Chon 
Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Ronald G. Russell 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
Attorneys for Bedford Property Investors, Inc. 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
**7 I. > J ( i i uuMjMtviHiiimimv***: tr 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER 
SALT LAKE AREA, a Utah non-
profit corporation, dba SALT 
LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS LLC, a 
Utah limited liability 
company, et. al. 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 960908063 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
This matter is before the Court on the parties1 cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were held on April 22, 2002. 
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the 'Court took the matter 
under advisement. Now, having fully considered the arguments of 
counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal 
authority the Court enters the following ruling. 
The relevant facts are as follows. In October 1983 Woodland 
Investment Company ("Woodland") owned the parcel of land located at 
4020 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah ("Tract A") and Woodland 
Associates ("Associates") owned the land located directly west of 
Tract A ("Tract B") . On October 27th, 1983 Woodland and Associates 
entered into a "Declaration of Easements Covenants and 
Restrictions" (the "1983 Declaration") under which the parties 
provided for: (1) an easement over Tract A which provided access to 
Tract B from 900 East; and (2) an easement over Tract B which 
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provided access to Tract A from 700 East. The language of 
the Declaration evidences the clear intent of the partise 
that both tracks would be commercial in nature. Eventually, Tract 
B developed commercially and currently contains: a parking 
facility, three high rise office buildings ("Towers I, II and 
III") , open parking areas and two retail centers. Tract A, on the 
other hand, was sold in 1992 to the Lutheran High School 
Association ("Plaintiff") . 
The current dispute revolves around a contiguous parcel of 
land owned by Woodlands IV and located immediately north of Tract 
B ("Tract C") . Tract C is an expansion of the original development 
and contains both a high rise office building ("Tower IV") and a 
multi level parking facility. Currently, Tract B tenants, working 
at Tower III, are permitted to use Tract C's parking facility. In 
order to reach the parking facility, Tract B workers use the 
easement over Tract A. Plaintiff objects to this use of the 
easement by claiming that it overburdens the easement in conflict 
with the original intention of the parties. 
As an initial matter, both parties agree that the benefit 
of the easement may not be enlarged to include Track C. 
Therefore, the tenants of Tower IV, located on Tract C, may not 
use the easement to access that property, Accordingly, defendants 
are ordered to take all necessary steps to restrict use of the 
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easement by Tower IV tenants, including notifying them, restricting 
access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may 
be appropriate. 
As to the remaining issue, the Court concludes that the 
easement is not overburdened by the Tract B tenants1 use of the 
easement to access parking on Tract C. 
Generally, the holder of an easement is entitled to use that 
easement in a banner "reasonably necessary for the convenient 
enjoyment of the servitude." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) 
§ 4.10 (2000). Additionally, the terms 1983 Declaration indicate 
that this easement was specifically designed for the "benefit" of 
the parties and their tenants. (Declaration of Easements Covenants 
and Restrictions Sec. 4 1 d), Here, the tenants of Tract B, for 
whom the easement was originally intended, make no greater use of 
the easement by parking on Tract C, than they would if they parked 
on Tract B; there is no evidence that the parking arrangement 
causes any additional vehicle traffic. In addition, although 
plaintiffs argued that the parking arrangement makes Tract C a 
beneficiary of the easement, there is no evidence in the record to 
support that. Rather, it appears that the tenants of Tract B only 
use the easement for the benefit and enjoyment of the servitude to 
which they are entitled. 
Accordingly,, defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is 
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granted, and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry and submit the same to the Court for review 
and signature. 
Dated this day of April, 2002 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINANCES IN EFFECT IN 1983 
Conditional Uses 22-31-2 - 22-31-3 
Eff. 3-23-72 (6) Appeals of .Decision. Any person shall have the right to 
appeal the decision of the Planning Director to the Planning Com-
mission by filing a letter with the Planning Commission within five 
(5) days of the Planning DirectorTs action, stating the reason for 
said appeal and requesting a hearing before the Planning Commission 
at the earliest regular meeting of the Commission. 
Eff. 8-18-77 Any person shall have the right to appeal to the Board of County Com-
missioners any decision rendered by the Planning Commission by filing 
in writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for the appeal 
with the Board of County Commissioners within ten (10) days following 
the date upon which the decision is made by the PlamiTng Commission. 
Eff. 3-20-76 After receiving said appeal the County Commission may reaffirm the 
Planning Commission decision or set a date for a public hearing. 
(a) Notification of Planning Commission. The Board of 
County Commissioners shall notify the Planning Commission of the 
date of said review, in writing, at least seven (7) days preceding 
said date set for hearing so that said Planning Commission may prepare 
the record for said hearing. 
Eff. 12-5-75 (b) Determination of Board of County Commissioners. The 
Board of County Commissioners after proper review of the decision of 
the Planning Commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further 
review and consideration any action taken by said Planning Commission. 
(7) Inspection. Following the issuance of a conditional use per-
mit by the Planning Commission the Director of Building Inspection 
shall approve an application for a building permit pursuant to Chapter 
3 of this Title and shall ensure that development is undertaken and 
completed in compliance with said permits. 
(8) Time Limit. Unless there is substantial action under a con-
ditional use permit v/ithin a maximum period of one (1) year of its 
issuance, the conditional use permit shall expire. The Planning 
Commission may grant a maximum extension of six (6) months under 
exceptional circuuistances. 
Eff. 6-22-73 Sec. 22-31-3. Planned Unit Development. 
(1) Introduction. Provision of a planned unit development by 
this chapter in no way guarantees a property owner the right to exercise 
the provisions of the planned unit development. Planned unit develop-
ments shall be approved by the Planning Commission only if, in its 
judgment the proposed planned unit development fully meets the intent 
and purpose and requirements of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) Purpose. The purpose of the planned unit development is 
to allow diversification in the relationship of various uses and struc-
tures to their sites and to permit more flexibility in the use of such 
sites. The application of planned unit concepts is intended to encourage 
good neighborhood, housing, or area design, thus ensuring substantial 
compliance with the intent of the district regulations and other pro-
visions of this Ordinance related to the public health, safety, and 
general welfare and at the same time securing the advantages of large-
scale site planning for residential, commercial or industrial 
developments, or combinations thereof. 
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(3) Definition. Planned unit development, for the purpose of this 
Ordinance, shall mean an integrated design for development of residential, 
commercial, or industrial uses, or combination of such uses, In which one 
or more of the regulations, other than use regulations, of the District 
in which the development is to be situated, is waived or varied to allow 
flexibility and initiative in site and building design and location in 
accordance with an approved plan and imposed general requirements as 
specified in this Chapter. A planned unit development may be (1) The 
development of compatible land uses arranged in such a way as to provide 
desirable living environments that may include private and common open 
spaces for recreation, circulation and/or aesthetic uses. (2) The con-
servation or development of desirable amentities not otherwise possible 
by typical development standards. (3) Creation of areas for multiple 
use that are of benefit to the neighborhood. 
(4) Planned Unit Development Permit. Planned unit developments may 
be allowed by Planning Commission approval in any zoning district. An 
approved planned unit development shall consist of an otficial planned 
unit development form approved by the Planning Commission and signed by 
its chairman, and an approved site plan also signed by the chairman of 
the Planning Commission. Denial of a planned unit development shall 
also be indicated on the official form. A planned unit development permit 
shall not be granted unless the planned unit development meets the use 
limitations of the zoning district in which it is to be located and 
meets the density and other limitations of such districts. Compliance 
with the regulations of this Ordinance in no sense excuses the developer 
from the applicable requirements of the Subdivision Ordinance, except as 
modifications thereof a) e specifically authorised in the approval of the 
application for the planned unit rlevelopii nt, The permit shall be 
considered in two parts (I) Preliminary approval subject to the public 
hearing provisions of paragraph 22-31-3-9 this Chapter and (2) Final 
approval based on construct ion drawings and SPSCJfTcitions in general 
accord with that granted preliminary approval. 
(5) Required Conditions. 
1. No planned ua.L development .hall ha^e an area of less than 
one (1) acre. 
2. A planned unit development which will contain uses not 
permitted in the zoning district in which it is to be located will require 
a change of zoning district and shall be accompanied by an application for 
a zoning amendment, except: tiiat any residential use shall be considered 
a permitted use in a planned unit development which allows residential 
uses and shall be governed b r design and othet requirements of the 
planned unit development p< j.mit. Provided further that in single family 
zones, not including the *K /onos, only single family dwellings may be 
allowed in the planned unit development. Hotels, motels, Lodges, mobile 
home parks, etc., shall not be considered residential uses for the purpose 
of this Chapter, 
3. The development shall be in single, partnership, or corporate 
ownership, or under option to purchase by an individual or a corporate 
entity at the time of application or the application shall be filed 
jointly by all owners of the property. 
4. The Planning forunirsion shall require such arrangement of 
structures and open spaces within the site development plan, as necessary, 
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to assure that adjacent properties will not be adversely affected. 
a. Height and intensity of buildings and uses shall 
be arranged, around the boundaries of the planned unit development, 
to be compatible with existing adjacent developments or zones. 
However, unless conditions of the site so warrant, buildings located 
on the periphery of the development shall be limited to a maximum 
height of two (2) stories. 
b. Lot area, lot width, yard and coverage regulations 
shall be determined by approval of the site plan. 
c. Density of dwelling units per acre shall be the 
same as allowed in the zone in which the planned unit development 
is located. 
5. Preservation, maintenance and ownership of required 
open space within the development shall be accomplished by: 
a. Dedication of the land as a public park or 
parkway system; or 
b. Granting to Salt Lake County a permanent open 
space easement on or over the said private open spaces to guarantee 
that the open space remain perpetually in recreational use with 
ownership and maintenance being the responsibility of the owner or 
an Owner's Association established with articles of association and 
by-laws which are satisfactory to Salt Lake County; or 
c. Complying with the provisions of the Condominium 
Ownership Act of 1963, Title 57, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, which provides for the payment of common expenses 
for the upkeep of the common areas and facilities. 
6. Landscaping, fencing and screening related to the uses 
within the site and as a means of integrating the proposed development 
into its surroundings shall be planned and presented to the Planning 
Commission for approval., together with other required plans for the 
development. 
7. The size, location, design and nature of signs, if any, 
and the intensity and direction of area floodlighting shall be detailed 
in the application. 
8. A grading and drainage plan shall be submitted to the 
Planning Commission with the application. 
(6) Planned Unit Development Site Plan Requirements. The ap-
plicant shall submit a planned unit development plan for the total 
area within the proposed development. If the planned unit develop-
ment is to be developed on a phase basis each phase shall be of 
such size, ^ composition and arrangement that its construction, 
marketing and operation is feasible as a unit independent of any 
subsequent phases. Final approval shall be given only to one phase 
at a time. The general site plan shall show, where pertinent: 
1. The use or uses, dimensions, sketch elevations, 
and locations of proposed structures. 
2. Dimensions and locations of areas to be reserved and 
developed for vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking, 
public uses such as schools and playgrounds, landscaping, and other 
open spaces. 
3. Architectural drawings and sketches outlining the 
general design and charjcter of the proposed uses and the physical 
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relationships of the uses. 
4. Such other pertinent information including, but not 
limited to, residential density, coverage and open space characteristics 
shall be included as may be necessary to make a determination that the 
contemplated arrangement of buildings and uses makes it desirable to 
apply regulations and requirements differing from those ordinarily ap-
plicable under this Ordinance. 
(7) Scope of Planning Commission Action. In carrying out the 
intent of this Chapter the Planning Commission shall consider the 
following principles: 
1. It is the intent of this Chapter that site and building 
plans for a planned unit development shall be prepared by a designer or 
team of designers having professional competence in urban planning as 
proposed in the application. The Commission may require the applicant 
to engage such a qualified designer or design team. 
2. It is not the intent of this Section that control of the 
design of a planned unit development by the Planning Commission be so 
rigidly exercised that individual initiative be stifled and substantial 
additional expense incurred; rather, it is the intent of this Section 
that the control exercised be the minimum necessary to achieve the 
purpose of this Chapter. 
3. The Planning Commission may approve or disapprove an ap-
plication for a planned unit development. In approving an application 
the Commission may attach such conditions as it may deem necessary to 
secure compliance with the puiposes set forth in Section 22-31-2(5) 
this Chapter. The Action of the Planning Commission may be appealed 
to the County Commission, 
(8) Construction Limitations. 
1. Upon approval of a planned unit development construction 
shall proceed only in accordance with the plans and specifications 
approved by the Planning Commission and in conformity with any conditions 
attached by the Commission to its approval. 
2. Amendments to approved plans and specifications for a 
planned unit development shall be approved by the Planning Commission 
and shown on the approved plans. 
3. The building inspector or any other county department 
shall not issue any permit for any proposed building, structure, activity 
or use within the project unless such building, structure, activity, or 
use is in accordance with the approved development plan and any condi-
tions imposed in conjunction with its approval. 
A. The building inspector shall issue a certificate of 
occupancy signed by the Planning Director for any building or structure 
upon its completion in accordance with the approved development plan. 
(9) Public Hearing. Preliminary development plans including site 
plan, (buildings, open space, parking, landscaping, pedestrian and 
traffic circulation) building elevations and general drainage and utility 
layout with topography shall be submitted for the purpose of public 
review. A public hearing shall be held after a notice of hearing in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the area concerned not less than 10 
days prior to the date of said hearing. Failure of property owners to 
receive notice of said hearing shall In no way affect the validity of 
action taken. 
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(10) Fees. 
1. See Section 22-31-2 (3) for the planned unit develop-
ment fee, plus subdivision fee, as per lot schedule in the Subdivision 
Ordinance. 
Sec. 22-31-4. Sale of Alcoholic Beverages Special Provisions. 
(1) The Planning Commission shall authorize a conditional use 
permit to sell alcoholic beverages except Class "A" beer outlets and 
Class "B" beer outlets where it is determined by the Planning 
Commission: 
a. That the use is not in the immediate proximity of 
any school, church, library, public playground, or park. 
b. That the proposed use at a particular location is 
necessary and desirable to provide said service or facility which 
will contribute to the general well being of the neighborhood and 
the community; and 
c. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety or general 
welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious 
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and 
d. That the proposed use will comply with regulations 
and conditions specified in this Title for such use; and 
e. That the proposed use will conform to the intent of 
the Salt Lake County Master Plan. 
(2) All conditional use permits for uses dispensing alcoholic 
beverages to be consumed on the premises are subject to an annual 
review, and all applications for a conditional use permit for con-
sumption of liquor on the premises must be accompanied by a payment 
of a twenty-five dollar ($25.00) fee. Said fees are considered 
reasonable because of the costs of investigation and studies 
necessary for the administration hereof. 
(3) The granting of any permit by the Planning Commission to 
dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to review by the Salt Lake 
County Commission. The denial of any permit by the Planning Com-
mission to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to review by the 
District Courts. All appeals of Planning Commission decisions to 
the Board of County Commissioners or the District Courts must be 
filed with the appropriate body within thirty (30) days from the 
date of the Planning Commission Decision. 
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(a) Notification of Planning Commission. The Board of County 
Commissioners shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of said review, 
in writing, at least seven (7) days preceding said date set for hearing so 
that said Planning Commission may prepare the record for said hearing. 
(b) Determination of Board of County Commissioners. The Board of 
County Commissioners after proper review of the decision of the Planning 
Commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and 
consideration any action taken by said Planning Coramission. (Eff. 12-5-75) 
(7) Inspection. Following the issuance of a conditional use permit by 
the Planning Commission the Director of Building Inspection shall approve an 
application for a building permit pursuant to Chapter 3 of this Title and 
shall ensure that development is undertaken and completed in compliance with 
said permits. 
(8) Time Limit. Unless there is substantial action under a conditional 
use permit within a maximum period of one (1) year of its issuance, the 
conditional use permit shall expire. The Planning Commission may grant a 
maximum extension of six (6) months under exceptional circumstances. 
Sec. 22-31-3. Planned Unit Development. (Eff. 6-22-73) 
(1) Introduction. Provision of a planned unit development by this 
chapter in no way guarantees a property owner the right to exercise the 
provisions of the planned unit development. Planned unit developments shall 
be approved by the Planning Commission only if, in its judgment, the proposed 
planned unit development fully meets the intent and purpose and requirements 
of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) Purpose. The purpose of the planned unit development is to allow 
diversification in the relationship of various uses and structures to their 
sites and to permit more flexibility in the use of such sites. The 
application of planned unit concepts is intended to encourage good 
neighborhood, housing, or area design, thus ensuring substantial compliance 
with the intent of the district regulations and other provisions of this 
Ordinance related to the public health, safety, and general welfare and at the 
same time securing the advantages of large-scale site planning for 
residential, commercial or industrial developments, or combinations thereof. 
(3) Definition. Planned unit development, for the purpose of this 
Ordinance, shall mean an integrated design for development of residential, 
commercial, or industrial uses, or combination of such uses, in which one or 
more of the regulations, other than use regulations, of the District in which 
the development is to be situated, is waived, or varied to allow flexibility 
and initiative in site and buildilng design and location in accordance with an 
approved plan and imposed general requirements as specified in this Chapter. 
A planned unit development may be (1) The development of compatible land uses 
arranged in such a way as to provide desirable living environments that may 
include private and common open spaces for recreation, circulation and/or 
aesthetic uses. (2) The conservation or development of desirable amentities 
not otherwise possible by typical development standards. (3) Creation of 
areas for multiple use that are of benefit to the neighborhood. 
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(4) Planned Unit Development Permit. (Eff. 2-16-84) Planned unit-
developments may be allowed by the Planning Commission approval in any zoning 
district. An approved planned unit development shall consist of a final 
approval letter and a final approved site plan, A planned unit development 
permit shall not be granted unless the planned unit development meets the use 
limitations of the zoning district in which it is to be located and meets the 
density and other limitations of such districts. Compliance with the 
regulations of this Ordinance in no sense excuses the developer from the 
applicable requirements of the Subdivision Ordinance, except as modifications 
thereof are specifically authorized in the approval of the application for the 
planned unit development. The permit shall be considered in two parts (1) 
Preliminary approval subject to the public hearing meeting provisions of 
paragraph 22-31-3-9 this Chapter and (2) Final approval based on construction 
drawings and specifications in general accord with that granted preliminary 
approval. 
(5) Required Conditions. 
1. No planned unit development shall have an area of less than one 
(1) acre. 
2. A planned unit development which will contain uses not permitted 
in the zoning district in which it is to be located will require a change of 
zoning district and shall be accompanied by an application for a zoning 
amendment, except that any residential use shall be considered a permitted use 
in a planned unit development which allows residential uses and shall be 
governed by design and other requirements of the planned unit development 
permit. Provided further that in single family zones, not including the FR 
Zones, only single family dwellings may be allowed in the planned unit 
development. Hotels, motels, lodges, mobile home parks, etc., shall not be 
considered residential uses for the purpose of this Chapter. 
3. The development shall be in single, partnership, or corporate 
ownership, or under option to purchase by an individual or a corporate entity 
at the time of application or the application shall be filed jointly by all 
owners of the property. 
4. The Planning Commission shall require such arrangement of 
structures and open spaces within the site development plan, as necessary, to 
assure that adjacent properties will not be adversely affected, 
a. Height and intensity of buildings and uses shall be 
arranged, around the boundaries of the planned unit development, to be 
compatible with existing adjacent developments or zones. However, unless 
conditions of the site so warrant, buildings located on the periphery of the 
development shall be limited to a maximum height of two (2) stories. 
b. Lot area, lot width, yard and coverage regulations shall be 
determined by approval of the site plan, 
c. Density of dwelling units per acre shall be the same as 
allowed in the zone in which the planned unit development is located. 
5. Preservation, maintenance and ownership of required open space 
within the development shall be accomplished by: 
a. Dedication of the land as a public park or parkway system; or 
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b. Granting to Salt Lake County a permanent open space easement 
on or over the said private open spaces to guarantee that the open space 
remain perpetually in recreational use with ownership and maintenance being 
the responsibility of the owner or an Owner's Association established with 
articles of association and by-laws which are satisfactory to Salt Lake 
County; or 
c. Complying with the provisions of the Condominium Ownership 
Act of 1963, Title 57, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which 
provides for the payment of common expenses for the upkeep of the common areas 
and facilities. 
6. Landscaping, fencing and screening related to the uses within 
the site and as a means of integrating the proposed development into its 
surroundings shall be planned and presented to the Planning Commission for 
approval, together with other required plans for the development. 
7. The size, location, design and nature of signs, if any, and the 
intensity and direction of area floodlighting shall be detailed in the 
application. 
8. A grading and drainage plan shall be submitted to the Planning 
Commission with the application. 
(6) Planned Unit Development Site Plan Requirements. (Eff. 2-16-84) The 
applicant shall submit a planned unit development plan for the total area 
within the proposed development. If the planned unit development is to be 
developed on a phase basis each phase shall be on such size, composition and 
arrangement that its construction, marketing and operation is feasible as a 
unit independent of any subsequent phases. The general site plan shall show, 
where pertinent: 
1. The use or uses, dimensions, sketch elevations, and locations of 
proposed structures. 
2. Dimensions and locations of areas to be reserved and developed 
for vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking, public uses such as schools 
and playgrounds, landscaping, and other open spaces. 
3. Architectural drawings and sketches outlining the general design 
and character of the proposed uses and the physical relationships of the uses. 
4. Such other pertinent information including, but not limited to, 
residential density, coverage and open space characteristics shall be included 
as may be necessary to make a determination that the contemplated arrangement 
of buildings and uses makes it desirable to apply regulations and requirements 
differing from those ordinarily applicable under this Ordinance. 
(7) Scope of Planning Commission Action. In carrying out the intent of 
this Chapter the Planning Commission shall consider the following principles: 
1. It is the intent of this Chapter that site and building plans 
for a planned unit development shall be prepared by a designer or team of 
designers having professional competence in urban planning as proposed in the 
application. The Commission may require the applicant to engage such a 
qualified designer or design team. 
2. It is not the intent of this Section that control of the design 
of a planned unit development by the Planning Commission be so regidly 
exercised that individual initiative be stifled and substantial additional 
expense incurred; rather, it is the intent of this Section that the control 
exercised be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose of this Chapter. 
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3. The Planning Commission may approve or disapprove an application 
for a planned unit development. In approving an application the Commission 
may attach such conditions as it may deem necessary to secure compliance with 
the purposes set forth in Section 22-31-2(5) this Chapter. The action of the 
Planning Commission may be appealed to the County Commission. 
(8) Construction Limitations. 
1. Upon approval of a planned unit development construction shall 
proceed only in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by the 
Planning Commission and in conformity with any conditions attached by the 
Commission to its approval. 
2. Amendments to approved plans and specifications for a planned 
unit development shall be approved by the Planning Commission and shown on the 
approved plans. 
3. The building inspector or any other county department shall not 
issue any permit for any proposed building, structure, activity or use within 
the project unless such building, structure, activity, or use is accordance 
with the approved development plan and any conditions imposed in conjunction 
with its approval. 
4. The building inspector shall issue a certificate of occupancy 
signed by the Planning Director for any building or structure upon its 
completion in accordance with the approved development plan. 
(9) Public Meeting. (Eff. 2-16-84) Preliminary development plans 
including site plan, (buildings, open space, parking, landscaping, pedestrian 
and traffic circulation) building elevations and general drainage and utility 
layout with topography shall be submitted for the purpose of staff analysis 
and Planning Commission review at a regularly scheduled meeting. 
(10) Fees. 
1. See Section 22-31-2 (3) for the planned unit develoment fee, 
plus subdivision fee, as per lot schedule in the Subdivision Ordinance. 
Sec. 22-31-4. Sale of Alcoholic Beverages Special Provisions. 
(1) The Planning Commission shall authorize a conditional use permit to 
sell alcoholic beverages except Class "A" beer outlets and Class "B" beer 
outlets where it is determined by the Planning Commission: 
a. That the use is not in the immediate proximity of any school, 
church, library, public playground, or park. 
b. That the proposed use at a particular location is necessary and 
desirable to provide said service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well being of the neighborhood and the community; and 
c. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of 
persons residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity; and 
d. That the proposed use will comply with regulations and 
conditions specified in this Title for such use; and 
e. That the proposed use will conform to the intent of the Salt 
Lake County Master Plan. 
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